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Abstract 
Government industrial relations law reforms can have widespread implications 
on the power tussle between workers, the union, and the employer. This 
dissertation examines how the Australian Government’s reforms since 1996 have 
impacted the union movement. During this period, both left and right-wing 
political parties implemented new industrial relations frameworks, consequently 
abolishing the well-entrenched 1904 arbitration system with its preferred 
compulsory unionism provisions.  
  
Key aspects of union organising and activism were analysed to determine the 
effects and influence of these reforms. This analysis included statistical data 
evaluating union membership and strike action. The principle findings of this 
dissertation are that the narrowing of regulations, particularly concerning 
freedoms to disassociate, individualism, and workplace right of entry, negatively 
impacted the union movement. This was evident by the declines of union 
membership and strike action. The reforms eroded protective collective rights 
resulting in a serious threat to the Australian union movement. The union 
movement subsequently adjusted its structural approach by adopting the 
organising works model. However, the implementation of the organising works 
model has not curbed union membership or industrial action declines.  
  
The Abbott Coalition government is yet to make any significant labour reforms. 
With union membership currently representing only 17% of the workforce, the 
Australian union movement is in a fragile predicament as to its future. 
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 Chapter One – Introduction 
1.1 Introduction   
Leading labour law scholar Kahn-Freund makes the following observation of the 
government’s role in regulating labour law, ‘the main object of labour law [is] to 
be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which 
is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship’.1 Thus, the 
primary objective of the government legislating labour laws is to address the 
imbalance of power within the employment relationship by providing parties a 
platform of equal footing. The employer has access to economic capital and 
skilled bargaining resources. In contrast, employees sell their labour and are 
often replaceable. Thus, the employer has a stronghold to dictate employment 
terms. One means for employees to address this power imbalance is through 
collective membership and solidarity within the union movement. As conflict will 
inevitably arise between employers and unions out of the protection of 
employees’ interests, the government may intervene if this impedes on public 
interest. That being said, government intervention is not always aimed at 
providing equal footing. It is the primary aim of this dissertation to explore this 
through the analysis of the challenges faced by the union movement in the 
context of Australian labour law reforms since 1996. To achieve this, each 
government’s intervention through party policy2 and law reforms will be 
considered. This dissertation will question whether such intervention has 
weakened unions’ ability to freely function. This analysis will be conducted with 
particular focus on industrial action, collective agreement-making, workplace 
right of entry, right to strike, and union membership.  
 
From 1904, Australian unions experienced stability as a majority quasi-secure 
actor within the labour framework with legislated compulsory unionism through 
the ‘conciliation and arbitration system’ (arbitration).3 Unions flourished as 
regulations supported advocacy and union recognition. Economic growth in 
                                         
1 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law - Hamlyn Lecture Series (Stevens and Sons, 5 May 1972), 
p 18 
2 ‘Party policy’ is comparable to UK’s white paper 
3 See Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309  
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manufacturing, infrastructure, and public services also contributed to the rise in 
unionism and collective bargaining.4 Yet, recent reforms, economics, and 
political changes altered the union movement’s capabilities where they are no 
longer a majority workplace party. This dissertation concentrates on post-1996 
reforms, which coincided with a dramatic decline in union membership and 
strike action. A commonly cited reason for this decline is ‘the shift in economy 
system… brought about by financialization, its interaction with the government, 
and the resultant inadequacies of labour’s capacity to response’.5 From 1996, 
both left and right-wing political parties were encouraged by market liberal 
ideology to introduce a new labour framework. This dissertation will consider 
three periods of government: the John Howard Coalition (1996-2006), Kevin 
Rudd and Julia Gillard Labor (2007-2013), and the Tony Abbott Coalition (from 
2013). In doing so, it will explore the impact of the reforms against a socio-legal 
analysis of declines in union membership and industrial disputes. Furthermore, it 
will examine the implication in theory and model shifts from a corporatism, 
operating under a service model, to pluralism, operating under an organising 
model.  
 
To evaluate post-1996 labour reforms, literature relating to the union 
movement’s organisation of workers will be considered. In assessing such 
interaction, this dissertation will primarily illustrate how reforms have directly 
impacted on unions’ ability to represent workers’ rights. It will question whether 
the relevant governments went beyond implementing labour reforms. This is 
disputable in light of their clearly publicised opinion of unions. Howard’s 
Coalition government openly broadcasted its law reform intentions, which 
focused on ‘eradicating’ unions from the workplace in preference for individual 
rights.6 Subsequent governments largely adopted Howard’s individualist 
approach. Even when the union movement backed the Labor party for the 2007 
election, once in office, Rudd publicised that it was not the government’s 
                                         
4 Mark Bray and Andrew Stewart, 'From the arbitration system to the Fair Work Act' (2013) 34 
Adelaide Law Review 21, p 25 
5 David Peetz and Janis Bailey, 'Dancing Alone: The Australian Union Movement Over Three 
Decades' (2012) 54(4) Journal of industrial relations 525, p 528 
6 Liberal-National Coalition party, Better pay for better work - industrial relations policy (1995) 
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position to secure the unions’ role as workers’ advocate.7 Upon the Coalition 
party’s return to office in 2013, Abbott announced a Royal Commission to probe 
into union governance and corruption to ‘shine [a] spotlight in to the dark 
corners’ of the movement.8  
 
Consequently, the union movement can no longer rely on long-standing 
government relationships, political influence, or a return of arbitration laws. A 
comparison of government reforms and attitudes towards unions against Kahn-
Fraund’s principles of labour law (as stated above) shows that the union 
movement must adapt its strategies. It must become its own ‘countervailing 
force’ to collectively counteract workers’ unequal bargaining powers and 
advance workers’ rights. This is particularly the case when governmental 
reforms have failed to impose an equal footing platform approach.9  
 
 
1.2 Dissertation structure 
This dissertation comprises five chapters. Chapter Two contains a historical 
review of labour laws introduced in 1904. It evaluates the arbitration system 
featuring compulsory unionism, and considers the ‘organising’ approach of the 
union movement and its shift from this approach in light of recent reforms.10 A 
statistical data benchmark of union membership and industrial disputes will 
illustrate the pre-1996 arbitration system against the reforms.  
 
Chapter Three evaluates the Howard Coalition government reforms from 1996 to 
2007. It examines party policy and labour reforms against the pre-1996 
arbitration system.  Declines in union membership are evaluated against 
membership trends in other western countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) 
and United States (US). While these countries’ law reforms will not be 
                                         
7 George Megalogenis, 'Rudd casts unions adrift' (5 May 2007)  The Australian   
8 Latika Bourke and Emma Griffiths, 'Prime Minister Tony Abbott announces royal commission to 
"shine spotlight" on alleged union corruption' (11 February 2014)  Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) News   
9 Kahn-Freund, n 1 
10 David Peetz and Barbara Pocock, 'An Analysis of Workplace Representatives, Union Power and 
Democracy in Australia' (2009) 47(4) British journal of industrial relations 623, pp 628-30 
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considered here, this comparison will advance the hypothesis that the Australian 
government’s interventions went beyond the conceivable implications from 
globalisation and responsive law reforms.  
 
Chapter Four examines the Rudd and Gillard Labor government reforms from 
2007 to 2013. It questions party policy and law reforms compared against the 
arbitration system and the Howard government reforms. The impact of these 
reforms will be assessed against outcomes from Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) statistical data in relation to union membership and industrial action.  
 
Chapter Five contains a final discussion of the dissertation’s aims and how the 
research presented addresses the central hypothesis. A brief summary of each 
government’s framework will also consider the political actions of the Abbott 
Coalition government from 2013. Concluding this dissertation will be an 
evaluation of the impacts of law reforms and their influence on the future of the 
Australian union movement.     
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 below will briefly 
introduce key models and the unique Australian government structure and 
political parties, which have influenced both the implementation of reforms and 
the union movement’s structure.   
 
 
1.3 Australia’s political and parliamentary structure 
The Parliament of Australia has a bicameral structure represented by 150 
elected members of the ‘House of Representatives’ (embracing elements of the 
executive Westminster system) and 76 members of the ‘Senate’ (adopting 
features from US Congress), who are appointed by Federal and State government 
representatives. The significance of this structure is that legislation must pass 
both houses. Consequently, an objection by either house to any tabled Bill could 
indefinitely delay the passing of legislation.11  
 
                                         
11 See Australian Government, Parliament of Australia (2014) 
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The separation of the two houses impacted on the Howard, Rudd and Abbott 
governments’ ability to pass reforms during their first terms in office. This will 
be further discussed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. 
 
Further, there are two major representing Australian political parties: the 
Coalition, a centre-right economic liberalist and social conservative party 
representing farmers (National Party) and upper-middle-class society (Liberal 
Party), and Labor, a centre-left democratic socialist party with union influence, 
which is considered a labour movement representative. An influential minor 
party that will also be discussed in this dissertation is the Australian Democratic 
Party, which broke away from the Liberal party in 1977. It represents social-
liberal ideology and middle-class left-leaning ideals. 
 
 
1.4 Union organisation models 
Creighton, Ford, and Mitchell claim that for maximum performance of its 
organising functions, a union ‘requires a level of membership and financial 
resources, which is sufficient to enable it to exercise power in the labour 
market. It also requires a degree of protection for its officers as they go about 
conducting the affairs of the organisation’.12 These requirements extend to a 
number of union functions: the ability to recruit members, provide services to 
existing members, and advocate on their behalf. To execute these functions, the 
movement may shift its strategic approach according to changes due to 
globalisation, economics, and law reforms that can impact its organising 
capacity. This dissertation considers in particular whether the aggressive reforms 
after 1996 resulted in the union movement shifting from a corporatist to a 
pluralist approach. 
 
From corporatism to pluralism  
Schmitter defines ‘corporatism’ as occurring where a state and a privileged 
interest group benefit from a political exchange. The corporatist structure is 
described as: 
                                         
12 Breen Creighton, William Ford and Richard James Mitchell, Labour law : text and materials 
(Law Book Company, 2nd Ed. ed, 1993), p 995 
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‘a system of interest representation in which the constituents units are 
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of 
leaders and articulation of demands and supports’.13  
 
Corporatism as a policy process is the interaction between the public authority 
and the union movement to cooperate ‘in the articulation of interests, allocation 
of values and implementation of policy’.14 Prior to the 1996 reforms, the labour 
framework functioned under an arbitration system regulated compulsory 
unionism, assuring high union membership representing the majority of the 
workforce. Consequently, they were influential in government policy formation, 
and had the power to influence significant governmental economic reforms. This 
will be further discussed in Chapter Two.15  
 
‘Pluralism’ focuses on aggregating preference to members and prioritising self-
interest, differing from corporatism, which focuses on shared conception of 
public good.16 Pluralism envisages participation by a multitude of ‘voluntary, 
competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined’17 interest groups, 
which do not exercise any representative monopoly, influence (government), or 
receive any special state endorsement.18 In 1996, the Howard Coalition 
government’s sweeping reforms led to an inimical relationship with the unions 
with the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act) and Work Choices19 laws 
                                         
13 Phillippe C. Schmitter, 'Still the century of corporatism?' (1974)  Review of Politics 85, p 93 
14 Tonia Novitz and Phil Syrpis, 'Assessing Legitimate Structures for the Making of Transnational 
Labour Law: The Durability of Corporatism' (2006) 10 Industrial Law Journal 367, p 371 
15 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 2010), pp 706-7 
16 Christian Hunold, 'Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a Deliberative Theory of 
Bureaucratic Accountability' (2001) 14(2) Governance 151, p 160 
17 Schmitter, n 13, p 96 
18 Novitz and Syrpis, n 14, p 373 
19 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia; 
Canberra  
7 
 
marginalising their role.20 The aptly labelled ‘anti-unions’21 reforms removed 
unions as a recognised party from the workplace, gave preference to individual 
freedom of disassociating rights for workers, and abolished compulsory unionism. 
It is possible that these reforms aimed to force a model shift from secure 
corporatism, with laws mandating the unions’ compulsory involvement, to the 
pluralism approach, with heavily regulated activity and constituted 
individualism. The Rudd Labor government’s Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) 
continued to largely align with pluralism, as the ‘law [continued to] defers more 
to individualistic free choice than collective rights’.22 The legislation failed to 
recognise the union as a party involved in collective bargaining. In fact, it only 
recognised the employer and employees as parties to any agreement. 
 
Historically, the Australian unions’ strategic models are heavily influenced by 
abundant government regulations. This regulation has been fundamentally 
different to that of other countries such as the UK. Until the late 1990s, the UK 
unions’ strategies were shaped by minimal regulatory influence and government 
intervention through a period of ‘voluntarism’. Voluntarism is the ‘principle of 
non-interference by the state and the action of employers and trade unions, 
save in cases where collective representation does not deliver industry justice or 
stability’.23 Subsequently in 2000 the UK Labour government introduced the 
Employment Relations Act 1999, bringing into force a new statutory union 
recognition procedure. While it has been stated that it was not the Blair 
Government’s intention to promote collective bargaining, the reforms did enable 
unions to be recognised as a party if they could demonstrate majority support 
when mobilising for collective bargaining.24 Thus, UK unions’ strategic models 
have only recently been influenced by government dictation. However, these 
regulations have not demonstrated the magnitude of those seen in the Australian 
                                         
20 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, p 155 
21 Australian Council of Trade Unions, 'About Trade Unions' (2012)  Australian Council of Trade 
Unions   
22 Breen Creighton and Andrew Forsyth, Rediscovering Collective Bargaining: Australia's Fair 
Work Act in International Perspective (Routledge, 2012), p 216 
23 Sian Moore, Sonia McKay and Sarah Veale, Statutory Regulation and Employment Relations - 
The Impact of Statutory Trade Union Recognition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p 10 
24 Ibid, pp 1-2  
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labour system. Furthermore, the UK unions are currently privileged with 
legislated recognition in collective bargaining. In comparison, the recent 
Australian reforms demonstrate ‘an active role [in the] institutional 
architecture, in the marking out of the boundaries of [the] bargaining system, 
and in shaping the relationship between (and sometimes within) the industrial 
relations parties’.25 Reforms have decentralised bargaining, heavily regulated the 
unions’ ability to organise workers, and removed them as a registered party to 
any bargaining agreement. Thus, Australian reforms have distinctively 
challenged the union movement. In response, it has shifted its approach and 
strategies to defend and improve employment conditions.26  In April 1999, 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) delegates travelled to the UK, 
Belgium, Canada, Ireland, and the US to observe membership building strategies. 
ACTU Secretary Greg Combet announced a significant shift in policy when 
launching unions@work.27 Adopting ‘organising works’, this document 
emphasised the need to develop workplace activism, and broaden the union 
agenda.28  
 
From logic of influence and logic of membership 
Intertwined with corporatism and pluralism approaches, Streeck and Schmitter29 
identify two competing concepts for assessing an organisation’s governance and 
members’ involvement. First, the ‘logic of influence’ denotes that the union 
movement ‘adapt[s its] aims and methods to the actual decision-making 
processes on which they [the union, not its members] wish to exert an impact’.30 
Unions focus on ‘gain[ing] access to and exercise[ing] adequate influence over 
public authorities (or conflicting class associations)’, concentrating on what can 
                                         
25 Rae Cooper, 'Remaking industrial Relations? Unions, the state and industrial relations regime 
change in Britain and Australia' (April 2008)  Australian Review of Public Affairs   
26 Bob Carter and Rae Cooper, 'The Organizing Model and the Management of Change : A 
Comparative Study of Unions in Australia and Britain' (2002) 57(4) Relations industrielles 
(Québec) 712 
27 Australian Council of Trade Unions, 'unions@work - the challenge for unions in creating a JUST 
and FAIR society' (30 August 1999)  Australian Council of Trade Unions   
28 Peetz and Pocock, n 10, p 629 
29 See Wolfgang Streeck and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Private Interest Government: Beyond Market 
and State (Sage, 1985) 
30 Richard Hyman, 'Trade unions and the politics of the European social model' (2005) 26(1) 
Economic and Industrial Democracy 9, p 24 
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be achieved from associations with other actors or third parties. Yet, an 
organisation would largely operate autonomously from its members by 
concentrating on how an organisation acts on its members’ behalf. The ability of 
an organisation to successfully influence in this way ‘enabl[es] them to survive 
and to prosper’.31 Such as during the arbitration system, the Australian union 
movement held majority workplace representation, had little member decision-
making involvement, and could significantly influence other parties within the 
labour framework.  
 
Secondly, the ‘logic of membership’ concept refers to organisational policies 
that ‘maintain their representative credentials by articulating the wishes and 
interests of their constituents’.32 Members play an active role in the organising 
and function the body. They are attracted to the union because of its protection 
of conditions and other incentives. Flourishing membership offers sureties to the 
union movement. It enables unions to ‘extract from them [members] adequate 
resources to ensure their [unions] survival’.33 Conversely, this approach gives 
first priority to members’ needs, which differs from the first logic. 
 
Germany’s unions, for example, experienced a shift from a logic of influence to 
a logic of membership as a result of social policy reforms in the mid-1980s to 
1990s. In 1984 burdensome collective bargaining provisions existed, which the 
government did not change ‘in fear of unmanageable industrial and political 
conflict’.34 With increased international competition, this resulted in high 
unemployment and onerous social policy, leading to greater reliance on social 
security. In the 1990s, Germany’s fiscal capacities had been exhausted leading 
to cut backs in social security spending. This resulted in changes to their social 
policy, and union’s influence diminished. This ‘contributed to the [unions’] 
                                         
31 Wolfgang Streeck and Phillippe C. Schmitter, 'The Organization of Business Interests: Studying 
the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies' (1999) MPIfG Discussion 
paper 99/1 Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Germany 29, p 19 
32 Hyman, n 30, p 24 
33 Streeck and Schmitter, n 31, p 19 
34 Wolfgang Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism : Institutional Change in the German Political 
Economy (OUP Oxford, 2009), p 64 
10 
 
organisational decline, among other things by weakening their control over their 
members.’35 
 
In Australia, concurrent to the Howard government heavily regulating 
individualism and decentralised bargaining, a diminishing corporatist approach 
gradually instigated a shift to a pluralist model. In doing so, the union movement 
oriented its structure to align with the logic of membership approach.  
 
 
1.5 Research methodology and data 
The research in this dissertation predominantly focuses on evolving the 
hypothesis that post-1996 labour reforms had damaging impacts on the union 
movement. It analyses primary source law reforms and secondary source 
literature. The review of primary sources identifies imperative legal rights, law 
reforms, and concepts to support the advancement of the hypothesis, while 
secondary sources support the understanding of legal concepts and their 
application. 
 
While several academic secondary sources have examined law reforms against 
the effects on union activism, to date they have only compared the influence of 
reforms against either union membership, or industrial action, but not both 
factors concurrently. This dissertation will consider both aspects to better 
establish whether the reforms have impacted on union strength, function, and 
the ability to organise members. Furthermore, there has been minimal study of 
the adoption of organisational models or strategies by Australian unions. This 
dissertation will advance that discussion by way of comparison to other 
countries. It will also examine the strategic approach taken by unions in 
response to decades of declining membership, workplace presence, organisation, 
and resources.  
 
Existing primary and secondary sources will be supplemented by quantitative 
research, which will provide a fuller understanding of the impact on union 
                                         
35 Ibid 
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membership and industrial action through the introduction of new statistical 
data. Analysing such data from the relevant governmental periods will assist in 
determining how the reforms may have encouraged or diminished the union 
movement. Quantitative resources offer insight into the research topic by 
providing the materials to conduct a generalised and objective analysis of the 
hypothesis36 and has several advantages. The data used is sourced from the ABS, 
a government agency and Australia’s official national statistical organisation.37 It 
records statistics on economic, environmental and social issues. First, the data 
used addresses the aims of this dissertation by either advancing or disputing the 
hypothesis. It can be analysed by recorded units to identify variations of union 
membership and industrial action over a captured time. Second, this data offers 
a basis for a more precise discussion on the impact of law reforms on the union 
movement. Finally, ABS is a reliable and consistent impartial source measuring 
data from 1912 to 2014. This dissertation considers data that measures union 
membership,38 and industrial disputes.39 The data has been correlated with 
matching periods of governmental reform to illustrate trends over the periods in 
question. 
 
There has been criticism of the use of quantitative research, particularly in 
surveying data to illustrate broader social changes. However, ABS materials 
evaluate the trends of periodic data with a consistent methodology from year to 
year based on the variance of sampling. This dissertation considers periodic data 
over the most recent 18-years of reforms (however ABS statistics will be 
considered from 1912-2013). Therefore, it is believed that year to year variance 
will have minimal influence on the outcome of this dissertation. Thus, the use of 
both primary sources and academic secondary sources in conjunction with 
quantitative data will provide a comprehensive foundation to prove or disprove 
the hypothesis. It will also further current research and discussions on the topic 
of the Australian union movement and its organising strategies.      
  
                                         
36 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods. (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2004), p 281 
37 Recorded ABS data published on http://www.abs.gov.au with latest release on 4 June 2014 
38 ABS, 'Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Members, Australia - Catalogue no. 6310.0' 
(4 June 2014)   
39 ABS, 'Industrial Disputes, Australia, December 2013 - Catalogue no. 6321.0.55' (March 2014)   
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Chapter Two: The history of the union movement 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to the recent 18 ‘years of regulatory failure’40, Australia’s arbitration 
system was untouched by any significant reforms for nearly 100 years. 
Historically, English common law and the emerging labour laws accompanied 
European settlement. Australia then implemented a unique strategy in 1904 by 
adopting the arbitration system. This novel system reinforced ‘compulsory’ 
arbitration where opposing parties could compel each other to the employment 
tribunal41 regardless of the significance of the industrial dispute. In effect, the 
arbitration system secured unions’ compulsory involvement as most disputes 
were fast-tracked for tribunal resolution.42  
 
This chapter will provide a brief analysis of the arbitration system that was 
adopted as the predominant labour dispute resolution framework from 1904 to 
the mid-1990s. The arbitration system guaranteed that the ‘service’ model 
adopted by the union movement safeguarded high union membership. This 
system provided quasi union recognition that guaranteed the unions a role to 
service members.43 To appreciate the implications of recent reforms, this 
chapter will also consider the shift in approach from a service to ‘organising’ 
model. In effect, union leaders became more dependent on organising members 
as the union movement was no longer secured as a compulsory stakeholder. 
Thus, consideration will primarily focus on how these approaches integrated 
within the legal framework either by being encouraged or displaced by the 
reforms.  
                                         
40 Andrew Stewart, Australian Labour Law, Past and Present; Keynote speech (2012 Labour Law 
Conference, 13 August 2012) 
41 The industrial relations juridical system in the 20th century held various titles, which will be 
referred to in this dissertation as the ‘tribunal’. In 1904 the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1904 (Cth) Part II – ‘Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration’, then in 1988 the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) established the ‘Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission’ (AIRC); and in 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) established the 
‘Industrial Relations Court of Australia’ that would only hear matters on referral from the 
AIRC. The Fair Work Act 2009 renamed the AIRC to ‘Fair Work Australia’ then ‘Fair Work 
Commission’. 
42 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, pp 32-8 
43 Bray and Stewart, n 4, pp 24-5 
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Finally, a brief analysis will also consider the potential influence that the Accord 
agreement (from 1983 to mid-1990s) may have had on the service model. During 
this period Australia was amid an economic crisis resulting in high rates of 
unemployment in the mid-1980s. One strategic response involved the 
government and union movement entering into an agreement to restrict wage 
demands by fixing wage increases.  
 
 
2.2 Compulsory conciliation and arbitration in the 20th 
century 
At the end of the 19th century, labour law regulation assumed a different 
structure from that which originated from English settlement. Rather than 
adopting an existing framework, Australia introduced an arbitration system for 
labour dispute resolutions. This system was partially dictated in the Australian 
Constitution44 s 51 (xxxv) that includes ‘conciliation and arbitration of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State’.45  
 
In 1904, the new Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (CA Act),46 later replaced 
by the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (IR Act), emphasised ‘conciliation and 
arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one State’.47 It operated through most of the 20th 
century and ‘placed a heavy emphasis on delegated regulation’48 and uniquely 
featured ‘compulsory unionism’, which was strategically relied upon by unions 
and operated in two forms. First, by ‘closed shop agreements’, where the 
worker was required to join a preferred union in order to obtain or retain 
employment. Second, by ‘union preference clauses’ ensuring preference for 
                                         
44 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), United Kingdom was enacted on 
9 July 1900, and enforce on 1 January 1901 
45 See Creighton and Stewart, n 15, Chapter 4 
46 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia; Canberra  
47 CA Act - Long title. 
48 Bray and Stewart, n 4, p 24 
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engagement and promotion of union members, while non-members were more 
likely to be terminated in cases of workforce retrenchment (provided an equal 
assessment criteria was met).49  
 
Yet, the CA Act provided some confining industrial action regulations. During the 
second reading of the Bill, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin declared that a primary 
objective of the Act was to ensure ‘no more strikes or lockouts’. 50 The sentiment 
was mirrored in the s 2(1) objectives of the CA Act. Yet, the CA Act not only 
pursued the prevention of strike action, it prohibited any person or organisation 
undertaking ‘anything in the nature of a lock-out and strike action’ as a manner 
for dealing with industrial disputes51 by imposing a penalty of 1000 pounds 
(equivalent $13,000 AUD or £7,000 today). As an exception, s 6(3) permitted 
industrial action ‘to anything proven to have been done for a good cause’.52 As a 
result, the arbitration conferred union recognition as a party to a dispute to 
counter-balance the prohibition to organise strike action.53 This recognition 
permitted the union to independently bring disputes for conciliation or binding 
arbitration under s 55(1) of the CA Act.  
 
Criticism of these provisions suggested that the ‘price paid’ by unions for 
recognition in the arbitration system was ‘unprecedented legislative supervision 
of their [unions’] internal affairs’ that relinquished the right to strike.54 
Creighton and Stewart, who compared Australia’s framework against 
international systems, identified two characteristics that distinguished 
arbitration system: compulsoriness and consideration of the public interest. 
These characteristics were reflected in the Court’s duty to use lawful means to 
                                         
49 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 2010), pp 706-7 
50 Alfred Deakin, 'Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 1904 - second reading speech' (22 March 1904)  
Prime Minister - Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Hansard  
51 CA Act – Part II – Prohibition of lock-outs and strikes  
52 CA Act s 6(3), the defendant carrying the onus of proof  
53 CA Act s 26 – ‘Any organisation represented before the Court… shall be deemed a party to the 
dispute’; and s 27- ‘On the hearing or determination of any industrial dispute an organisation 
may be represented by a member or officer of any organisation’ 
54 Shae McCrystal, The Right to Strike in Australia, Labour history (Canberra) (Federation Press, 
2010), p 53 
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reconcile the parties’ industrial disputes (including prevention and settlement) 
particularly when mediation was in the public interest.55  
 
Firstly, as Creighton and Stewart note, the arbitration system’s ‘compulsory’ 
character implied that in the event of a dispute, a party could be forced to 
partake in arbitration or centralised bargaining to achieve a resolution.56 
Furthermore, with a centralised agreement approach emphasised by the CA 
Act,57 employers were bound to broad non-individualised conditions of 
employment based on sectors of industry or occupation. Traditionally, if one 
sector increased wages and conditions, this ‘flowed on’ to other sectors 
resulting in relatively compressed wage differentials over sectors.58  
 
The arbitration system did not dictate regulations that prioritised or opposed 
centralised agreement-making. However, for nearly 100 years the centralised 
approach was merely accepted by parties and preferred by tribunal members.59 
The CA Act identified that ‘any organisation may make an industrial agreement 
with any other organisation’.60 Thus, the legislation encouraged agreement-
making and dispute settlement through the arbitration system, whereby unions 
played a highly active role. With knowledge of compulsory arbitration, unions 
would demonstrate their industrial position and strength by engaging in strike 
action prior to the commencement of negotiations. As a further consequence, 
unions were influential in government policy-making, and were well positioned 
for advocating members’ interests. While this action was unlawful,61 it was 
common practice for unions to demonstrate dissatisfaction (even for minor 
disputes) by organising strike action to ‘pressure’ employers into accepting 
                                         
55 CA Act s 16 – The Jurisdiction of the President and the Court; and Industrial Relations Reform 
Act 1993 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia; Canberra s 9 ‘Commission to take into account 
the public interest’ 
56 CA Act ss 38 (j)-(s) provides the Court with the power to summon and compel parties to appear  
57 CA Act - Part VI – Industrial Agreements; an agreement could bind multiple organisations 
(industry) and unions. An agreement could be operational for a period of up to three years. 
58 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, pp 34-38 
59 Ibid 
60 CA Act s 73  
61 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 6(1); unless s 6(2) where leave was obtained by 
the President or s 6(3) the action was for a good cause independent of the industrial dispute 
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claims. This in turn resulted in a significant reduction of days worked by 
employees due to drawn out industrial action. In effect, parties ‘did not need to 
take ultimate responsibility for finding a solution to their dispute’62 as parties 
relied on the tribunal to either issue a resolution or conciliate with parties to 
achieve a resolution.  
 
The second characteristic safeguarded ‘public interest’. Here, the tribunal went 
beyond merely bringing parties together for dispute resolution.63 It was not 
enough for parties to be satisfied, the interests of the community also had to be 
served. This particularly applied for matters where the tribunal played a 
‘guardian of public interest’ role when considering the minimum conditions of 
industrial awards (awards) against whether or not to approve the drafted terms 
of a proposed agreement.64 As awards covered most Australian workers, the 
tribunal regulated these conditions of employment in considerable detail 
through annual award reviews.  
 
Furthermore, ‘while there was no explicit mechanism for union recognition’65 
within the laws, unlike that which is provided for in the US,66 unions still had 
open access to the tribunal. The union had strength to convene agreement-
bargaining with an employer. If an employer refused to negotiate, the tribunal 
would order a compulsory conference. Thus, the union’s comfort within the 
arbitration system may have meant that it failed to recognise the urgency to 
alter strategies in preparation for the possibility that a changing government 
may abolish compulsory unionism. 
 
The end of the arbitration system 
During the 1980s, the arbitration system was subject to increased criticism from 
academics, employer associations, and conservative commentators. It was said 
that the arbitration system produced unnecessarily high labour costs and failed 
                                         
62 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, p 37 
63 CA Act ss 9, and 16 
64 CA Act s 16; and Creighton and Stewart, n 15, pp 37-8 
65 Bray and Stewart, n 4, p 25 
66 Rae Cooper and Bradon Ellem, '‘Less than zero’: union recognition and bargaining rights in 
Australia 1996–2007' (2011) 52(1) Labor History 49 
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to provide sufficient incentives to improve productivity. Furthermore, it was 
potentially ‘incapable of economically efficient outcomes’.67 
  
Leading into the 1990s, various stakeholders (the Labor party, the Coalition 
party, and employer associations) voiced a preference for decentralised 
agreement-making to boost productivity and international competitiveness. With 
the Labor party holding government office from 1983 to 1996, they introduced 
the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (IR Reforms).68 The IR reforms amended 
the IR Act introducing s 170MA-MM enterprise level agreements called ‘certified 
agreements’ that contrasted with existing ‘industry level agreements’. These 
reforms implemented numerous subsections to s 170 detailing ‘minimum 
conditions of employment’, introducing statutory entitlements that were 
generally negotiated during the agreement-making period. Yet, there was 
minimal uptake of the certified agreements as employers, unions, and the 
tribunal continued to opt for industry-based agreements. This may be explained 
because the certified agreement-making process continued to require union 
involvement as a compulsory party69 so there was no impetus for change. The 
main significance of the IR Reforms was the ‘legislative ability’ to make 
individual agreements. How this agreement type and the individualism approach 
would impact on unions’ involvement in collective bargaining would not be a 
concern for the movement until the 1996 reforms. This will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Union membership 
Until the 1990s, the arbitration system secured high membership as unions were 
a quasi-secured actor as a privileged collective voice for members.70 Table 1 
reveals that union members significantly reflected the unions’ strength and 
influence on policy-makers. The arbitration system resulted in trends of strong 
                                         
67 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, p 38 
68 These amendments where incorporated into IR Act 
69 CA Act s 170MC(1)(g), only one union can be recorded as the workers’ representative 
70 Bray and Stewart, n 4, p 24 
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membership density levels that remained above 40% from 1912 to 1992, and 
peaked at 60% in the 1950s.71  
 
Table 1 – Union membership 1912-199672  
 Males ('000) % Females ('000) % Persons ('000) % 
1912  44  8  30 
1925  58  34   
1950s      60 
1960s      55 
1976     2,510.00 51 
1982     2,570.00 49 
 
1986 1,685.10 50 908.8 39 2,593.90 46 
1988 1,640.20 46 895.7 35 2,535.90 42 
1990 1,683.80 45 975.8 35 2,659.60 41 
 
1992 1,536.10 43 972.7 35 2,508.80 40 
1993 1,437.70 41 939.2 33 2,376.90 38 
1994 1,375.80 38 907.5 31 2,283.40 35 
1995 1,349.70 36 902.0 29 2,251.80 33 
1996 1,307.50 34 886.8 28 2,194.30 31 
 
 
However, a slight decline in union membership commencing in the late 1980s 
may be explained by the concurrent financial crisis and recession that continued 
into the early 1990s. This recession resulted in considerable instability within 
the workforce with unemployment reaching 10.9% in December 1992.73  
 
Table 1 also identifies gender differences in members. The gender density of 
membership remained higher among male than female members. In the early 
1900s, male workers were the more dominant gender within the workforce. 
However, it may also reflect that male dominated industries were more exposed 
to compulsory unionism provisions of closed shop and union security preference 
                                         
71 From 1912-1986, ABS statistics did not record the number of members, or gender. Surveying 
was not regularly conducted. From 1986-1992, surveys were conducted bi-yearly. 
72 ABS, n 38; and ABS, n 39; ABS, 'Labour forces, Australia - Catalogue no. 6202.0' (2014)   
73 ABS, n 72; in comparison the Australian unemployment rate was 5.8% in April 2014 
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arrangements. These arrangements were particularly operational in the heavy 
industries, which continue to remain male dominated.74  
 
It may be said that unions heavily relied on such arrangements to maintain 
membership levels, focusing less on the strategies required to retain or recruit 
new members. In effect, the union movement had an absolute reliance on the 
labour laws75 to maintain its function as an actor76 through compulsory unionism 
that encouraged the servicing members approach. That being said, while 
Australia experienced a slight decline in density from 1976 to 1992, this 
decrease was consistent with other western countries experiencing instability 
from globalisation. Furthermore, the Australian union membership numbers held 
stable with over 2,500,000 members.77 
 
The Australian arbitration system internationally contextualised  
When compared to other jurisdictions, the Australian union membership rates 
was substantially higher from 1912 to 1960s. During the same period, the UK’s   
union membership represented 13% of the workforce in 1910. In 1920, union 
membership grew to 38%. However, membership dramatically declined from 
1926 to 1940 to below 30%. Post World War II in 1945 membership experienced a 
significant growth increase of 8% in one year leading into a period of union 
stability from 1946 to 1969 slightly over 40%.78  
 
As shown in Table 2, Australian membership numbers peaked during 1974 to 
1980 at 48% to 50%. From 1983, the next 13 years commenced a membership 
decline. This is in comparison to UK membership that peaked at nearly 50% from 
                                         
74 Australian Human Rights Commission, 'Women in male-dominated industries: A toolkit of 
strategies' (2013), in 2013, women account for only 12% of workers in construction, 15% of 
workers in mining, and 23% of workers in utilities 
75 CA Act Objects s 2(vi); and IR Act - Objects s 3(f) ‘encouraged the organisation of 
representative bodies’ 
76 See Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems, 'Report' (1985) 
2 the tribunal observed that system could not operate without a registered union and 
employer association representing its constituents. Also see R v Portus; Ex parte McNeil 
(1961) 105 CLR 537  
77 ABS, 'Australian Social Trends- Catalogue 4102.0' (2000)  72 
78 Craig Lindsay, 'A century of labour market change: 1900 to 2000' (2003)  Labour Market 
Division, Office for National Statistics, p 139 
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1980 to 1982. From the late 1970s to 1996 the Australian unions commenced a 
steady membership density decline, withdrawing from 50.2% in 1976 to 31.1% in 
1996. The UK membership did not commence a steady decline until 1983. During 
this period of decline between 1983 and 1996, the UK and Australia numbers 
were similar within a variance of +/- 0.3 to 2.7%. Then in 1996, the UK union 
membership held at 31.2%; 0.1% higher than Australia. 
 
Table 2 – Australia, UK, and US union membership 1970-199679 
%  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Country                             
Australia 44.2 45.4 46.3 47.2 48.8 50.1 50.2 49.5 49.7 49.6 48.5 47.4 47.5 47.9 
UK 43.0 43.4 44.3 43.6 44.5 42.0 44.7 46.3 48.2 48.7 49.7 49.9 49.7 48.2 
US 27.4 26.9 26.3 25.8 25.7 25.3 24.4 23.6 23.9 22.4 22.1 21.0 20.5 19.5 
 
 
%  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Country                           
Australia 47.1 45.5 46.0 42.3 42.0 39.4* 40.5 39.7* 39.6 37.6 35.0 32.7 31.1 
UK 46.9 44.2 44.2 43.2 41.3 38.6 37.8 37.2 36.2 35.3 33.8 32.2 31.2 
US 18.2 17.4 17.0 16.5 16.2 16.4 16.0 16.0 15.7 15.7 15.5 14.9 14.5 
 
 
The US membership levels have not reached the same peaks of representation as 
experienced in Australia and the UK. In 1930, membership represented 8% of the 
workforce. In 1940, levels increased to 18% then peaked in 1954 at 28.3%. 
Following this year, membership levels slowly declined.80 In 1974 and 1975, union 
membership was steady at 25%. Following this, US membership declined yearly 
by 0.3% to 1.5% (except for 1989, which increased by 0.2%). In 1996, membership 
was 14.5% representing an 11.2% decline in 20 years. When compared to 
Australia and the UK, this level represents around half the membership coverage 
in the working demographic.81  
 
 
                                         
79 Data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Trade union density' 
(2014)  OECD's iLibrary, with the exception of: 
a. 1989 to 2012 Great Britain data from Department for Business Innovation & Skills and 
Office of National Statistics, 'Trade union statistics 2013' (28 May 2014)  UK Government,  
b. 1989 to 2012 United States data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'Union Membership' 
(24 January 2014)  Division of Labor Force Statistics, and 
c. 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 to 2012 Australian data from ABS, 'Employee Earnings, Benefits and 
Trade Union Members, Australia - Catalogue no. 6310.0 ' (August 2012)    
80 Cornell University ILR School, 'Union Membership Trends in the United States' (31 August 2003)  
DigitalCommons@ILR   
81 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n 79 
21 
 
2.4 Industrial disputes 
While analysing union membership decline could be one measure of impacting 
reforms on the union movement, reforms that regulate organising strike action 
can be another. In analysing strike action regulations, elements such as the 
number of industrial disputes, working days lost, and workers’ involvement will 
be considered.82 During the arbitration system, the union movement resorted to 
the taking of industrial action to advance members’ conditions above the 
minimum legislated entitlements, or to bring the tribunal’s attention to an issue. 
From the commencement of records concerning industrial disputes, industrial 
disputes remained above 1,000 per year until 1992 with significant member 
involvement leading to high working days lost (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 – Industrial disputes from 1985-199583 
Year No of Disputes 
Employees involved 
(‘000s) 
Total working days 
lost (‘000s) 
1985 1,895 570.5 1,256.2 
1986 1,761 691.7 1,390.7 
1987 1,519 608.8 1,311.9 
1988 1,508 894.4 1,641.4 
1989 1,402 709.8 1,202.4 
1990 1,193 729.9 1,376.5 
1991 1,036 1181.6 1,610.6 
1992 728 871.5 941.2 
1993 610 489.6 635.8 
1994 560 265.1 501.6 
1995 643 344.3 547.6 
  
 
Indeed, when contrasted to other countries, Australia’s working days lost as a 
result of strike action was relatively high.84 However, industrial action declined 
from 1992. This period experienced considerable workforce instability during the 
early 1990s recession with record unemployment. Another explanation for the 
decline in industrial disputes in 1992 may align with the Keating Labor 
                                         
82 The ABS has recorded industrial disputes since 1985 
83 ABS, n 39 
84 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, p 37 
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government IR Reforms. 85 These amendments regulated the bargaining of 
certified agreements ensuring they would not be ‘disadvantageous’ to the 
workers’ conditions of employment as a whole. Thus, provided unions with a 
stronger position at the bargaining table and may explain the decline in 
industrial action from 1992-1995. 
 
 
2.5 Impact on the union movement from the Accord 
agreement 
It is important to briefly discuss the Accord agreement and its implications for 
the union movement. The union movement’s majority influence during the 
arbitration system led to the creation of an awards-based system for securing 
minimum wages and conditions of employment based on industry or occupation. 
However in 1983, the price paid for this corporatist inclusion and a high 
proportion of the workforce represented (46% union membership rates) led to 
the ACTU and Labor government entering into a price and income policy 
agreement called the Accord.86 Australia was in economic crisis and the 
government was under significant pressure due to the country being in recession. 
Real wages outpaced productivity growth and unemployment was at an 
unprecedented high of 10% (only surpassed during the great depression of the 
1930s). Consequently, this agreement was negotiated with the ACTU as they 
held such an influence as an actor in ‘managing the economy’.87  
 
The purpose of the Accord was to minimise inflation and improve social welfare, 
such as maternity leave, working conditions, and workplace safety. The ACTU 
agreed to the fixed wages terms in exchange for reforms in economic, social, 
and industrial policy. Furthermore, as a policy of strategic unionism, the ACTU 
negotiated within the Accord to amalgamate 300 unions into 20 ‘super unions’. 
                                         
85 IR Act - Division 3A ‘Certified Agreements’, which was repealed by IR Reforms - Part VIB that 
increased flexibility to enter into non-union agreements provided the ‘no disadvantaged test’ 
was satisfied 
86 David Peetz, Unions in a contrary world: The future of the Australian trade union movement 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 145-9 
87 Ibid, p 3 
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To achieve union registration, a minimum of 1,000 members was required as 
introduced under s 189 of the IR Act. It was further increased to 10,000 
members.88 Consequently, the Accord reduced registered union numbers from 
150 in 1983 to 51 in 1995.89 This restructure shifted the union movement’s 
agenda from emphasising strength at an individual workplace level to sector 
groups or industries level.90  
 
Impact of the Accord on membership 
On balance, this agreement may have been an error by the union movement. 
Analysis of union membership numbers against the commencement of the Accord 
by academics concluded unions may have contributed to their own demise by 
agreeing to the Accord.91 Simultaneously with the Accord’s operation, 
membership numbers started an unrelenting decline. The Accord brought 
secured fixed wage increases and improved social conditions, resulting in a 
reduced number of conditions requiring bargaining.92 As indicated in Table 1, 
membership fell from 46% in 1986 (membership was steady at around mid-40% to 
50% from 1912 to 1986) to 41% in 1992, then to 32.7% in 1995. Not only was 
there a decrease in density, there was also a mirroring decline in actual 
numbers.93  
 
Peetz analysed the impact of the Accord on the union movement.94 He 
considered two potential factors wherein the Accord may have led to member 
dissatisfaction. Firstly, members may have taken issue with the decline of ‘real’ 
wages (from the fixed agreement). Secondly, members may have experienced an 
‘alienation effect’ of removing rank and file members from the movement’s 
decision-making process. Yet, such an explanation implies that union 
membership should have declined more during the 1980s during the 
                                         
88 IR Act s 189 amended in 1991 
89 Bills Digest, '96 1995-96 Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 1996' (6 
June 1996)  Commonwealth of Australia  
90 Carter and Cooper, n 26, pp 725-9 
91 Peetz, n 86, pp 145-56 
92 Creighton and Stewart, n 15, p 687 
93 See discussion on membership impact in Peetz, n 86, pp 145-58 
94 Ibid, Chapter 7 
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deterioration of real wages, rather than the 1990s when real wages increased.95 
As shown in Table 1, the opposite effect was seen as the largest membership 
decline pre-1996 was in the early 1990s. Though, this may be explained as the 
actual operative impact of the Accord agreement. With fixed-wage increases on 
hold for eight to 10 years and inability to negotiate new social policy 
improvement, members may be have frustrated by the continuation of the 
Accord into the 1990s.  
 
That being said, Peetz concluded that there may have been minor impacts from 
the Accord, but the introduction of de-unionisation legislation from 1990-1995 
from State-based jurisdictional reforms could have been the more substantial 
influence.96 At this time, five out of six State governments had the conservative 
Liberal party in office. These States introduced reforms that prohibited 
compulsory unionism in preference for individualism.97 While the State 
governments’ reforms may have had a minor impact on membership, the more 
serious implication from these changes was that they paved a way for some of 
the more influential Federal reforms from 1996. 
 
As a result of the declining membership base, it was also perceived that unions 
had less power to influence regulations. Indeed, such a perception matched 
reality by the mid-1990s with membership declining by 13% from 1986-1995. 
While the Accord’s amalgamation of unions shifted the unions’ focus from 
individual workplaces to industry groups, the pending 1996 reforms prioritised 
individual workplaces by introducing a statutory preference for individual 
enterprise agreement-making and individual agreements.98 This will be discussed 
further in Chapter Three. 
 
 
                                         
95 Ibid 
96 Not all employers group were bound to the Federal Government industrial relations 
jurisdiction. State Governments could also legislate industrial relations laws covering 
employer groups not affected by the arbitration of interstate industrial disputes 
97 See Peetz, n 86, pp 175-97 
98 Coalition Government, Bills Digest 96 1995-96 Workplace Relations and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill 1996, 1996, Canberra 
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2.6 The union movement’s strategic models 
The union movements in developed countries adopt structure models as an 
approach to member representation. Such models address how to enhance union 
structure and membership recruitment, interact with laws, and influence 
governments. The following will discuss the two models largely used in Australia. 
Prevalent in the introduction of the CA Act, the service model or managerial 
servicing model was then followed in the mid-1990s by the emergence of the 
organising model, or known as the organising works model in Australia.99  
 
Service model 
The service model is based upon a transactional relationship with members 
whereby the union provides certain services in exchange for fees. This approach 
delivered member support that was secured by providing representation to 
advance members’ interests. It has been described as ‘unionism in which the 
function of the union is to deliver collective and individual services to members 
who are dependent on the formal organisation and its hierarchy of officers to 
provide what they require’.100  
 
While the service model was prevalent, members became devoted to the union 
movement because of the significant benefits it brought, such as representation 
in social policy, results from collective-bargaining, and job security from 
preference clauses and closed-shop agreements. The movement could also 
influence policy-makers to advance workers’ interests.101 Yet, members were 
generally not consulted for strategic decision-making or for advancing interests 
in policy. Members, as non-participants, witnessed that the success of the union 
movement delivered better and efficient services to members and improved 
social policy. Unions bore responsibility for the provisions relating to social 
services such as sick leave, literacy programs, unemployment benefits, workers 
                                         
99 See Peetz and Pocock, n 10 
100 Edmund  Heery et al, 'Organizing unionism comes to the UK' (2000) 22(1) Employee Relations 
38, p 38 
101 Samuel Bacharach, Peter Bamberger and William Sonnenstuhl, Mutual Aid and Union Renewal: 
Cycles of Logics of Action (Cornell University Press, 2001), p 22-7; and Jack Metzgar, An 
Organizing Model of Unionism (Midwest Center for Labor Research, 1991) 
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compensation, and death benefits (until such aid was provided by the 
government). The relationship between the employer and labour (workers and 
unions) was based on formal institutional arrangements with grievances resolved 
by the union for members through the arbitration system.102 Thus, members 
played an inactive role in this model.  
 
Within the service model, union advocacy took the form of bargaining 
representation, advocacy in legal matters, or for the supply for non-industrial 
materials. Paid union officials could ‘solve’ members’ problems with minimal 
involvement by members. Therefore, during the arbitration system, unions 
became more than a party that represented members’ interests. The union was 
an internal compulsory ‘third party to the employment relationship’103 involved 
within the workplace rather than an external advocator. In turn, unions heavily 
relied on the arbitration system to stake its place within the laws. Such reliance 
included the tribunal granting the annual award increases through a test case 
involving conditions and wages from meritorious arguments. Unions assured their 
claim in test cases with the threat of industrial dispute.  
 
When considering how the arbitration system interacted with the service model, 
it could be said that the two complemented each other by mutual enhancement. 
The elements of the arbitration system - among them the compulsory-party 
dispute resolution, centralised agreement-making, and compulsory unionism 
provisions – ensued the unions’ ability to retain high membership numbers. Thus, 
the service model ensured that unions prospered during most of the 20th century 
holding significant influence over policy-makers. While the service model and 
membership numbers were not inter-linked, numbers appeared to remain high as 
members felt that the workplace interaction that the service model provided 
made membership valuable. However, this model only thrived in the arbitration 
system because the legal framework encouraged servicing elements, which also 
aligned with the logic of influence. 
                                         
102 Paul  Jarley, 'Unions as Social Capital: Renewal through a Return to the Logic of Mutual Aid?' 
(2005) 29(4) Labor Studies Journal 1, p 1 
103 David Peetz, Carol Webb and Meredith Jones, 'Activism Amongst Workplace Union Delegates' 
(October 2002) 10(2) International journal of employment studies 83, pp 86-8 
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As discussed in Chapter One, such models integrate with opposing strategies of 
logic of influence and logic of membership. These logics define how an 
organisation’s synergises with government policy, social policy, and economic 
interests.104 Prior to 1996, the union movement aligned with a logic of influence. 
The movement’s monopoly of workforce representation resulted in influence and 
strength over governments and policy-making. Such influence resulted in high 
membership with favourable policies and concessions for constituents.105 
 
However, the service model has given way to mutual destabilization with 
reforms. What was overlooked by the union movement was the possibility of a 
government change with the Howard Coalition party obtaining office. The 
Howard reforms abolished the arbitration system. This will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Three. Yet, with the arbitration system sustaining logic of 
influence, these reforms would no longer sustain this logic. The service model 
has been seen as the basis of the union movements’ inability to adapt. There 
were several key faults to the servicing strategy. Hall and Harley identified that 
the approach could be aligned with ‘managerialist-service’ unionism, which 
discourages competition between unions in providing service. The service model 
was also resource intensive in satisfying member’s service demands. Thus, it was 
difficult for unions to redirect resources from servicing to member recruitment106 
when the reforms required unions to adapt to a declining membership base. 
 
A further criticism of the servicing approach related to the transactional 
relations element with membership fees being exchanged for the union resolving 
problems. With the 1996 reforms prohibiting union services in exchange for fees, 
unions were no longer considered a compulsory bargaining party. Thus, the 
transactional nature of the member-union relationship was perceived as being 
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less valuable by workers.107 Other key criticism related to unions’ involvement in 
the arbitration system was that it provoked ‘union tactics, which are legalistic 
and remote from members’ workplaces’108 giving the union little incentive to 
inform members of union strategies or encourage activism.  
 
Organising model 
In the mid-1990s, the union movement prioritised the implementation of the 
organising model in response to the decline in membership.109 The organising 
model focused on ‘building membership’, ‘re-examin[ing] organisational 
leadership’, and ‘facilitat[ing] effective workplace activism’.110 Thus, the 
relationship was reformed with members becoming actively involved in activities 
and even assuming union leadership roles. As Peetz et al argue, ‘[t]he philosophy 
behind the organising model is that empowering workers will enable them to 
find solutions to their problems’111 through the promotion of activism amongst 
workers and union delegates.  
 
As a result, the logic of membership approach became the predominant 
characteristic as a part of organising model as it encouraged an organisational 
structure with active members who unite in solidarity. 112 This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Until 1996, the traditional arbitration system with its components of collective 
bargaining and compulsory unionism bequeathed influence and strength to the 
union movement. Unions became dependent on compulsory membership that the 
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arbitration system bestowed resulting in steady membership rates in the high-
40%. In return, members were serviced with benefits and protection. The 10-
years of political economic change prior to 1995 led to a slight decline in union 
membership. Some of this decline has been linked to the outcomes of the 
Accord, political changes, and economic changes.  
 
As the change in government instigated reforms, the union movement shifts in 
structure, approaches, and character were necessary to counteract against 
political economics, and policy changes. In effect, corporatism gave way to 
pluralism. The service model was no longer supported by the legal framework 
spurring the union movement to adopt the organising model. The logic of 
influence gave way to the member preference logic of membership. However, 
the initial implementation of the organising model in the 1990s failed to address 
the decline in membership or growth strategies.  
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Chapter Three: The impact of the Howard 
government’s reforms on the union movement 
3.1 Introduction 
Howard led the Coalition party to defeat the Keating Labor government on 
11 March 1996. The election was heavily debated around the Coalition’s 
industrial relations policy of Better pay for better work. In office, the Coalition 
government objectives aimed at reducing the regulation of the labour market by 
introducing a new industrial relations framework. They did this through 
marginalising union involvement by prioritising employers’ interests under the 
guise of enterprise competitiveness.113 In effect, these reforms would restrict the 
union movement’s ability to organise members, and deny workers’ human rights. 
The government defended its stance on reforms and strongly denied critics 
labelling them as anti-unionist.114  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the extent to which the reforms were a 
systematic assault on the union movement. Since this dissertation aims to 
analyse the impact of legal reforms on unions, the binding laws must be 
examined first. This law review will serve a purpose of identifying the functional 
changes imposed on unions as well as illustrating the obstacles encountered in 
shifting from the service model. The focus lies therefore with the period 1996-
2007, starting with the introduction of the WR Act followed by Work Choices.115 
In evaluating these reforms, particular focus will be given to the provisions 
concerning freedom of association, workplace right of entry, unions’ 
involvement in collective bargaining, introduced individual workplace 
agreements, and unions’ scope for advocating for members. 
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Following the law review, this chapter will question whether these amendments 
were essential reforms, or should be criticised from a domestic and international 
perspective. Consideration will identify whether these reforms contravened 
Australia’s international obligations under International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Conventions. Then, ABS statistical data will be compared to analyse the 
decline in union membership and industrial action. In analysing these reforms, it 
seems that multiple factors contributed to membership and industrial action 
declines from 1996 to 2007. While the government reforms would be considered 
as having had significant impact on the movement, these reforms did not happen 
in a vacuum and other influences have intervened. Certainly, the broader 
context of globalisation should not be ignored.  
 
Finally, this chapter will draw conclusions as to whether the Howard government 
reforms impacted on the union movement. It will determine whether these 
reforms were an intentional attack on the union movement’s ability to organise 
workers. It will question whether the government had a policy agenda where 
reforms would influence union membership by confining advocacy, workplace 
presence, and collective freedom of association rights. 
 
 
3.2 Better pay for better work policy  
Leading into the 1996 election, the Coalition party released the Better pay for 
better work policy.116 The policy endeavoured to undermine unions’ strength and 
domination of the workplace. It also focused on encouraging competition across 
the super-union groups by permitting registration of smaller unions. The agenda 
pursued the abolishment of compulsory unionism provisions (trade union security 
and preference clauses) handing free membership to unions. This individually 
focused right denounced compulsory ‘conveniently belong’117 membership so far 
that the tribunal would no longer permit compulsory membership unionism terms 
within agreements. If such clauses existed in operational agreements, they 
would be considered illegal and non-binding. These provisions provided 
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overwhelming strength and compulsory presence to unions, particularly in blue 
collar industries, which was difficult for employers to displace.  
 
Further, policy elements sought to deregulate the union movement and 
promoted inter-union competition to service workers. It emphasised individual 
freedom to disassociate and a right to not join a union, which was propagandised 
as ‘freedom of association’ rights. It also sought to limit unions’ accessibility to 
workplaces by implementing stricter right of entry provisions. Union officials 
would require advance written notice when entering the workplace. It further 
pursued reforms to agreement-making and workers’ individual rights to enforce 
conditions. Priority was given to the creation of individual agreements called 
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). Additionally, the employer and 
workers would be able to self-bargain non-unionised collective agreements. The 
policy limited the unions’ ability to enforce these agreements or exercise a right 
to strike (with AWAs there was no right to take strike action). 
 
In contrast with the Keating government’s cooperation with unions, which 
created an environment conducive to the arrival of super-unions, this policy 
sought to reverse the unification by dis-amalgamating super-unions. It 
encouraged inter-union competition by encouraging smaller employee speciality 
associations to register.  
 
Finally, the policy sought to abolish the Trade Union Training Authority. The 
authority was a government funded scheme providing education and training to 
union officials. The Coalition party believed that taxpayers should be spared the 
expense of union training schemes, transferring the burden to unions.  
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3.3 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and Work 
Choices amendments 
Workplace Relations Bill  
In the second reading speech of the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill 1996 (WR Bill)118 the reforms sought to deliver a framework that 
ensured ‘the imperatives of world competition’ that balanced with ‘Australian 
values of ensuring a `fair go' for all’ that included ‘...fair competition, by 
removing monopoly rights and compulsory membership of industrial 
organisations’. 119 The Minister of Industrial Relations, Peter Reith, addressed 
criticisms of anti-union reforms during his second reading speech, stating that 
the ‘legislation is not an attack on unions. The legislation will assist unions who 
are seeking to be effective in providing a good service to their members’.120 
 
However, given Australia’s bicameral parliamentary system, the government 
experienced a repelling block against the Bill’s objectives as they did not have 
majority party Senate control. At this time, the government required the 
Australian Democrat Party’s support to obtain Senate majority for the passing of 
legislation. Thus, due to lack of wholesale support for the proposed reforms, the 
initial WR Bill reforms were barred from embracing the entire policy objectives. 
Yet, the successful 2004 election results (giving Howard a fourth term) secured 
majority control in the Senate and there was then no limitation to what law 
reforms could be passed.  
 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and Work Choices 
Section 3 of the WR Act defined the principle objective: ‘to provide a framework 
for cooperative workplace relations which promotes the economic prosperity and 
welfare of the people of Australia’.121 
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This objective prioritised individual freedom of association rights to disassociate 
and the introduction of AWAs, thus removing from the previous legislation some 
of Australia’s international obligations concerning freedom of association as 
defined in ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining, and ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise, both ratified in 1973.  
 
In 2005, with the government holding the Senate majority, Howard announced 
the Work Choices reforms that would ‘provide the long overdue framework to 
drive future productivity growth, create jobs and increase the standard of living 
of working Australians’.122 In the second reading of the Workplace Relations 
Amendments (Work Choices) Bill 2005, Minister Eric Abetz123 introduced the laws 
as ‘economic reform the Australian way—evolutionary and in a manner that 
advances prosperity and fairness together’. Work Choices’ objectives gave 
preference to individual workers’ freedom of association, implemented stronger 
right of entry provisions on union permit holders, and move power for 
compliance to a regulatory-controlled government monitoring agency system, 
the Workplace Authority. The agency would provide a tough compliance stance 
against unprotected industrial action including issuing of financial penalties and 
potential prosecution.124 
 
Work Choices implemented a further 35 provisions impacting on the unions 
functioning ability and involvement in agreement-making. The following 
discussion will analyse provisions that significantly impacted on unions, such as 
AWAs, collective bargaining, union registration, the remarkable narrowing of 
freedom of association powers, unions’ ability to exercise right of entry, and the 
granting union permit holders.  
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Individual agreements 
The government’s objectives for agreement-making sought to expand options 
and simplify the bargaining process by ‘not discriminate[ing] in favour of one 
form of agreement over another—collective or individual, union, or non-union’.125 
Part VID of the WR Act introduced significant reforms regarding worker’s right to 
bargain as an individual by introducing AWAs. AWAs enabled the individual 
employee to negotiate directly with the employer regardless of an operational 
union collective agreement and eliminated compulsory union involvement in 
bargaining. Although s 170VL(1) permitted AWAs negotiations on a group basis, 
the agreement had to be entered into on a one-to-one basis (employer-worker). 
Further, AWAs would supersede any operational tribunal-approved unionised 
collective agreement, even if the AWA was absent of minimum award conditions 
of employment. 
 
AWAs were publicised as offering workers real choice and negotiating power126 in 
their employment, but the balance of power was generally held by the 
employer. Essentially, AWAs permitted employers to offer an agreement on a 
‘take it, or no job’ basis.127 It has been said that the AWAs main purpose was to 
entirely remove the union from agreement-making and compliance. Once the 
agreements were registered with the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA), 
the OEA was responsible for monitoring AWA compliance. Unions were prohibited 
from offering any AWA compliance advocacy to employees, including the taking 
of industrial action. The AWA uptake pre-2006 Work Choices represented only 5% 
to 7% of the workforce, predominately within the mining, telecommunication 
and finance sectors.128   
 
Collective bargaining 
Part VIB of the WR Act contained the procedure for agreement-making. Several 
reforms intended to limit unions’ involvement. Section 170LC required unions to 
negotiate with the individual employer at an enterprise level by outlawing 
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industry wide pattern bargaining.129 Pattern bargaining involved unions selecting 
groups of employers within the same industry by instituting strike action and 
industrial bans. The industry could then be more accepting to collective 
bargaining as a majority. In effect, it exhausted unions’ resources with the 
super-union amalgamation of the Accords focused on grouped employer 
negotiations (now prohibited), not resource intensive individual employer 
enterprise bargaining.    
 
Additionally, s 298W of the WR Act (under Part XA – Freedom of Association) 
prohibited the inclusion of union preference provisions within collective 
agreements. It was believed that this reform would reduce demarcation disputes 
and encourage competition among unions to contest for representation of 
workers as opposed to being gifted or holding a monopoly over industries.130 
Effectively, the government sought to provide every employee with competitive 
representation and the freedom to disassociate. 
 
Union registration and structure 
With the Accord reducing the number of registered unions (from 150 in 1983 to 
51 unions in 1995131), the government considered unions as over-privileged and 
uncompetitive which failed to represent workers’ rights. Thus, Part IX of the WR 
Act contained the registered organisation provisions, which focused on 
‘encourage[ing] democratic control’ and ‘efficient management of 
organisations’. It encouraged the creation of new unions including autonomous 
enterprise branches of existing federal bodies.132 Section 189(1)(b) permitted the 
registration of a union with only 50 engaged employees.133 This was vastly 
distinct to the minimum of 10,000 members legislated in 1990 by the repealed IR 
Act. 
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In the WR Bill’s second reading speech, workers were encouraged to ‘set up an 
enterprise union of their own… special skills and service delivery to suit them, 
without artificial limits that protect current union monopolies’.134 The WR Act 
endorsed the dis-amalgamation of super-unions if the purpose of the union 
through the former government’s amalgamation became inadequate and 
dysfunctional.135 Finally, Schedule 19 of the WR Act abolished the Trade Union 
Training Authority.136  
 
Freedom of association 
Section 3(j) Objects and Part XA of the WR Act provided ‘freedom of association’ 
powers for individual employees to strengthen an individual’s right to choose 
whether or not to join a union.137 Further, if the employee sought to exercise the 
rights to disassociate, s 298Q prohibited unions from bringing any action against 
the employee.138 In addition, s 298L prevented an employer from undertaking 
‘prohibited action’139 against an employee because of their right to freedom of 
association or for reasons that include a prohibited reason.140 With the reverse 
onus test applied, the conduct was deemed to have occurred unless proven 
otherwise.  
 
In regards to the right to strike, the WR Act made two notable reforms. First, 
s 170VU of the WR Act extended the right to strike restrictions to cover non-
unionised agreements being AWAs and non-unionised collective agreements. 
Second, ss 170ML-MO permitted an employer to lockout workers in all strike 
action circumstances. Effectively, employers would be able to use the lockout 
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scenario to support their proposal to negotiate non-unionised collective 
agreements.141 
 
The WR Act’s objects failed to refer to Australia’s international treaty 
obligations for freedom of association. In fact, any reference to international 
treaty obligations was intentionally left absent from the objectives.142 The Bill 
Digest143 review of the WR Act recognised this absence, in particular concerning 
freedom of association, and questioned that the WR Act ‘may not conform’ to 
international treaty obligations or ILO’s recommendations.144 The review made 
particular reference to ILO Convention No. 98 regarding collective bargaining. In 
effect, individual AWAs were considered outside of Australia’s international 
obligations under ILO Convention No. 98 regarding rights to collective bargain. 
 
Workplace rights of entry 
The government increased regulation aimed at gravely restricting unions’ ability 
to freely access workplaces by limiting all access unless an employee had 
requested the union to attend the site. First, s 127AA of the WR Act abolished 
any operational right of entry provisions within collective agreements or awards. 
These terms largely provided the union with flexible rights of entry powers. This 
departure resulted in the WR Act being the sole remaining provision enabling 
right of entry.145 Second, s 285A tightened controls upon union officials who 
pursued access to an employer’s premises by requiring officials to be registered 
with a permit (permit holder); a holder was an authorised person by the tribunal 
after security and police checks.146 
 
Restrictions in s 285D(2) narrowed the union’s ability to freely access an 
employer’s premise in a timely manner by only being granted access to 
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investigate breaches,147 such as  underpayment of wages, conditions, award 
compliance, or safety. To satisfy these requirements, unions were required to 
demonstrate a ‘subjective belief or suspicion’ that a breach may have or had 
resulted. Alternatively, if a permit holder intended to access a premise, 24 
hours’ notice with a detailed explanation was required.148 This provision also 
prevented entry to the workplaces where unions had no members. 
 
 
3.4 Criticism of the reforms 
It light of the exhaustive scale of the legal amendments, these reforms can be 
objectively viewed as ‘the most fundamental revolution in industrial relations 
since federation’149 ‘with the purpose to weaken unions’.150 During the 
government’s term in office, an excess of 50 amending Bills were tabled (though 
the number of amendments that were enacted were significantly reduced as 
they failed to obtain sufficient Senate support until 2004).151 
 
Academics and unions harshly criticised the reforms - and particularly the Work 
Choices amendments - as being anti-unionist. The push for the 1996 reforms 
focused on instigating ‘workplace freedom’ or ‘freedom of association’ by 
enacting ‘individualised’ rights for employees over the rights of group (or union 
organisations). The WR Act ‘facilitated a shift of industrial power’ to the 
employers that bypassed unions.152 
 
Notably, Howard was exceptionally vocal in his wish to move away from the 
arbitration framework and unionised collective bargaining.153 Work Choices was 
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criticised as a system that undermined workers’ entitlements and defied the 
‘fair go’ within the workplace concept.154 In addition, Work Choices was 
perceived by many as ‘over-reaching’ due to its intention to rely upon the 
‘corporations’ power in the Constitution to cover all employees engaged by 
corporations by taking over State government worker coverage. This was viewed 
as erosion of State government powers155 and ultimately led to an unsuccessful 
High Court challenge.156 Notably, at a State government level, unions held most 
of their influence in State-based agreements.  
 
Freedom of association 
The term ‘freedom of association’ describes the collective right of employees to 
freely associate with unions without being discriminated against. These 
amendments destabilised the traditional functioning of such freedoms as the WR 
Act and Work Choices laws primarily focused on rights for the individual 
employees by redirecting freedom of association as a collective organisation.157   
 
In the second reading of the WR Bill, Minister of Industrial Relations, Reith 
stated that ‘the legislation ‘puts the emphasis on direct workplace relationships’ 
and ‘promotes a legislative framework without unnecessary complexity and 
unwanted third party intervention’ [emphasis added].158 His speech referred to 
principles of freedom of association, however only in terms of an individual’s 
right to disassociate. Thus, it was contentious that the government failed to 
recognise that unions may be a positive party for intervention rather than 
‘unwanted’ (with the inference being that neither party welcomed the 
‘interference’). Critics argued that by giving preference a negative right to 
disassociate, the government had twisted the concept of freedom of association 
as defined by international law.159 
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Naughton criticised the government’s proclamation that the reforms were ‘not 
anti-unionist’ as the objectives accentuated individual employees’ 
arrangements. Thus, the unsupported proclamation could not fool the public as 
it directly implied a reduced active role for unions.160 He summarised that the 
reforms were a direct impact on unions’ ability to function and were 
incompatible with genuine freedom of association principles. 
 
The WR Act s 298L prevented an employer from undertaking ‘prohibited 
conduct’161 against an employee for ‘prohibited reasons’. Section 298K regulated 
conduct by employers as: 
‘…must not, for a prohibited reason, or for reasons that include a 
prohibited reason, do or threaten to do any of the following:  
(a) dismiss an employee;  
(b) injure an employee in his or her employment;  
(c) alter the position of an employee to the employee's prejudice’. 
 
Initially, under the WR Act the tribunal was required to determine prohibited 
action by using the reverse onus test where the conduct was assumed to have 
occurred unless proven otherwise.162 In the landmark victory case against Patrick 
Stevedores waterfront,163 the union brought an action for reinstatement of 
dismissed union workers under s 298K. Here, Patrick (supported by government) 
restructured operations, liquidated the company employing unionised workers, 
terminated 1,400 unionised workers, and engaged non-unionised workers from 
Dubai.  
 
When ordering the workers reinstatement, North J stated: 
‘By dividing the functions of employing workers and owning the business 
between two companies, the Patrick group put in place a structure which 
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made it easier for it to dismiss the whole workforce. It is arguable on the 
evidence that this was done because the employees were members of the 
union… the Patrick employers acted in breach of s 298K(1) of the Act’.164 
 
This matter did not result in a flawless union victory. Within months, Patrick and 
the union reached a new workplace agreement that halved the workforce 
(terminated by redundancies), replaced it with casual workers and contractors, 
and implemented major workplace operational changes. This was arguably a win 
for Patrick Stevedores and future employers seeking to restructure operations, 
change conditions, and reduce their workforce.  
 
In response to the union’s victory in Patrick,165 the government amended Work 
Choices s 792(4) to require the ‘prohibited reason’ to be the ‘sole and dominant 
reason’.166 This reform was criticised as a narrowing of unions’ ability to protect 
their members and an exclusion of workers’ right to freedom of association. 
Effectively, the employer’s adverse conduct against a worker because they were 
a union member had to be proven as a sole or direct action of the membership 
consequently requiring a higher onus of proof. It provided employers with a way 
of operating around the definition of prohibited conduct if they sought to limit 
union representation in the workplace.167 
 
Unions were very vocal in their backlash against narrowing of the workers’ 
protection of prohibited conduct. The unions believed ‘effective freedom of 
association was compromised by these changes’168 arguing that the provisions 
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that protected workers’ from the right to freely belong to a union were 
ineffective.169  
 
The tribunal 
Academics condemned the tribunal’s application of the WR Act and Work 
Choices amendments. Quinn criticised the tribunal for being led by WR Act’s 
individual freedom of association provisions ‘into error and that the alternative 
purposive and functional approach [freedom of association according to 
international law] is preferable as a matter of doctrine and policy’. He 
emphasised that the individual choice approach alters the agreement-making 
process by removing long standing collective choice protection for unionists.170 
To support his statement, Quinn quoted two separate judgments. Griffith CJ171 
held that ‘unions were treated as bodies simply created by and for the 
furtherance of the ‘great purposes’ of the statute’. Then, Isaacs J,172 who 
acknowledged that the union’s ‘primary function [was] to help in the effort to 
maintain industrial peace’. He challenged the tribunal to adopt a broader 
collective choice approach to the WR Act, which would be consistent with 
Australia’s historical application and international obligations. 
 
Agreement-making 
Cooper, et al173 considered the AWAs to be ‘the most profound and controversial 
change’ reforms since AWAs were able to override operational collective 
agreements and awards. They concluded that it is difficult to disprove that AWAs 
did not have some impact on the worker’s need for union membership.174 A 
union’s abilities to represent workers during collective bargaining is a major 
element of its strength to protect the weak or disadvantaged, and mitigates 
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poverty.175 By removing unions’ representation, the reforms weakened the 
unions’ ability to protect vulnerable workers.176 This was demonstrated by 
political correspondence, Davis who revealed figures suggesting 45% of 
registered AWAs ‘stripped away all award conditions’ that the government 
promised to protect. He also criticised the government failure to release AWA 
statistics lodged with the OEA that would demonstrate that a third of the 2006 
agreements provided no wage increase with an absence of minimum employment 
conditions.177  
 
In BHP Iron Ore178 the union attempted to advance claims similar to those used in 
Patrick relating to prohibited conduct according to ss 298K-L of the WR Act 
attempting to link the employer offering AWAs, to the subsequent resignation of 
union membership. In highly criticised decision,179 it was held that there was no 
causal link between the employer offering AWAs and public statements quoting 
that the employer was reluctant to enter into union agreement negotiations.180 
The union’s submissions included workers’ statements that their union ‘was of 
little or no value after signing’ an AWA; and that it was ‘no use being a member 
of a Union any longer’. However, the union was not able to establish an 
intentional act (as prohibited conduct) to induce the ceasing of membership as a 
breach. It must be highlighted that five months following the decision and the 
implementation of AWAs at the Iron-Ore site, 62% of the workers had resigned 
their membership.181   
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Workplace right of entry 
The reforms curtailed the open freedom to access a workplace that was 
exercised by union officials.182 Officials were required to satisfy a raft of 
obligations prior to gaining entry. Ford compared the reforms against the 1973-
1996 right of entry provisions, which were uncomplicated rights negotiated 
between parties.183 He concluded that while it was difficult to obtain a balance 
between the interests of employers and unions, the interest of the employers 
was predominant in these provisions.  
 
The ACTU condemned these reforms as they impacted on the union’s ability to 
operate.184 The core ability for a union to exercise rights of entry to an 
employer’s premise ensures that the union (or officials) can perform its primary 
function as the workers’ representative185 by monitoring compliance of the law, 
conditions, and rights. It also aided in recruiting new members. One union even 
alleged that one employer only permitted the union to hold meetings in a car 
park under camera surveillance.186   
 
To access the workplace to investigate breaches, firstly the permit holder had to 
provide a written 24 hours’ notice of intention for entry (pre-1996 oral notice 
was sufficient). If the union sought to gain access to employment records, it was 
required to seek an order from the tribunal.187 This prevented the unions’ 
exercising entry in a timely manner. 
 
Under s 742, to be granted a permit, the official had to be assessed as a ‘fit and 
proper person’. They required training on the rights and responsibilities, must be 
clean of any criminal or industrial conviction, and could not had a similar permit 
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cancelled.188 A tribunal registrar or workplace inspector had discretionary 
powers to suspend or revoke permits on a contravention or misrepresentation of 
provisions.189 The complication of these provisions meant that if an official was 
implicated in the smallest of industrial disputes, they would not qualify to obtain 
a permit. 
 
The new system also restricted union access if the workplace was entirely 
covered by AWAs. As workers could enter into an AWA without union 
representation, unions were restricted from investigating breaches.190 Thus, 
there was a group of workers unrepresented even if representation was justified. 
Effectively, permit holders could only access a workplace with operational 
collective agreements or greenfields agreements.191 Finally, a permit holder was 
restricted in what area they could access within the premises. The employer 
could limit the official to a room and insist on escorting them while on site.192   
 
 
3.5 International obligations  
The Howard government attracted international attention as the reforms failed 
to maintain workers’ human rights. The reforms included a range of provisions 
that contravened key ILO Conventions.193 Australia is a signatory and a ratifying 
State of international treaties and instruments aimed at the protection of human 
rights. These instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and ILO Conventions, of which Convention No. 87 and 
Convention No. 98 will be the principal focus.  
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ILO Convention No. 87 lays out the right for workers and employers to establish 
and join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization to 
further and defend their interests (Arts 2 and 10). It further provides, inter alia, 
that ‘workers and employers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their 
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to 
organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes’ 
without interference by public authority (Art 3).194 ILO Convention No. 98 
requires a State to protect workers against anti-union discrimination (Art 1) with 
parties also being protected against acts of interference in their establishment, 
functioning or administration from others (Art 2). In adhering to this convention, 
the State should provide appropriate machinery, such as independent monitoring 
(Art 3). Furthermore, laws are to promote the full development and utilisation 
of machinery for voluntary collective bargaining (Art 4).195  The ICCPR and the 
ICESCR enshrine the right to form and join a union (ICCPR, Art 22 and ICESCR, 
Art. 8), and the right to strike (ICESCR, Art 8). The ICESCR further protects, inter 
alia, the right to work (Art 6), the right to fair working conditions (Art 7), and 
the right to social security (Art 9).196  
 
ILO supervisory bodies, in particular the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), criticised the 
government for its failure to comply with both Conventions No. 87 and No. 98. 
When evaluating the AWA provisions against the standards set by Convention No. 
98, the CEACR criticised the government for its failure to protect workers who 
did not agree to, or felt duress in accepting the AWA conditions. They noted the 
government’s failure to offer adequate discrimination protection. Further, the 
fact that an employer had the right to refuse to bargain collectively with unions 
and offer AWAs instead was criticised as it did not promote free and voluntary 
collective bargaining. Finally, no protection was afforded to workers entering 
into an AWA as they gave up their right to collectively bargain. The CEACR 
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*pointed out that these workers were at risk of being penalised by dismissal or 
by not being afforded employment, in particular because the employer was able 
to take an ‘AWA or nothing’ approach.197 
 
In considering article 3 of Convention No. 87, the CEACR also condemned the 
reforms’ ability to protect workers exercising a right to strike, in particular 
because the provisions heavily restricted industrial disputes during collective-
bargaining. Notably, disputes did not necessarily resolve at the end of 
agreement-bargaining. The CEACR noted that the reforms prohibited industrial 
action of pattern bargaining, secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, and 
bargaining over prohibited content, which are protected under Convention 87.198   
 
Fenwick and Landau highlighted the government’s unwillingness to conform. 
They cited the significant gap between the reforms’ freedom of association 
provisions, and international obligations. Noting that the amendments had ‘far-
reaching implications for the human rights of workers in Australia, as those 
rights are protected by Australia’s international legal obligations to protect and 
promote fundamental human rights’,199 they noted that the government took no 
active steps from 1999 to 2007 to adopt the CEACR’s recommendations to ensure 
Australia complied with its international obligations. In fact, Work Choices 
imposed tougher provisions taking Australia further away from meeting its 
international obligations. 
 
 
3.6 The impact of the reforms on the union movement  
The following will evaluate whether the reform impacted on the union 
movement by considering statistical data. If the reforms aimed at encouraging 
the unions’ demise, then the legislation could potentially be considered a 
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success if statistical data supported an actual decline in union membership and 
industrial action, concomitant to the legislative change.  
 
Decline in union membership 
In 1996, union membership represented 31.1% of the total workforce.200 Table 4 
illustrates the impact of the reforms on the union movement resulting with 
membership declining from 31.1% in 1996 to 18.9% in 2007. This equates to a 
12.2% decline over a period of 12 years, which represents nearly a halving in 
density of membership and largest historical fall in recorded membership. The 
average loss of membership over this period equals 1.02% each year.  
 
Table 4 – Union members from 1996-2006201 
Year Males ('000) % Females ('000) % Persons ('000) % 
1996 1,307.5 34 886.8 28 2,194.3 31.1 
1997 1,266.7 33 843.7 27 2,110.3 30.3 
1998 1,188.9 30 848.5 26 2,037.5 28.1 
1999 1,103.7 28 774.5 23 1,878.2 25.7 
2000 1,095.0 26 806.7 23 1,901.8 24.7 
2001 1,088.8 26 813.9 23 1,902.7 24.5 
2002 1,045.4 25 788.3 22 1,833.7 23.1 
2003 1,051.1 24 815.6 22 1,866.7 23.0 
2004 1,051.6 24 826.5 22 1,842.1 22.7 
2005 1,070.7 24 841.2 21 1,911.9 22.4 
2006 993.6 21 792.4 19 1,786.0 20.3 
2007 937.1 20 759.3 18 1,696.4 18.9 
Variance  -370.4 -14% -127.5 -10% -497.9 -12.2% 
 
 
Further, actual member numbers fell by 497,900 from 1996 to 2007. The 
declines in both union membership and numbers was predominantly among male 
members. This may be linked to the abolishment of the compulsory unionism 
arrangements that were widely operational in male dominant industries such as 
construction, forestry, mining, manufacturing and transport. 
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Peetz made the observation that this period of decline was due to three factors: 
labour market change, an institutional break from compulsory unionism, 
decollectivising bargaining, and the failure of some unions to provide 
infrastructure or act in cohesion.202 A demonstration of the impact of agreement-
making reforms was the rollout out of AWAs in BHP Iron Ore.203 Here, workers 
linked membership value and retention to the union’s abilities to participate in 
collective bargaining as a service.   
 
Peetz and Pocock remarked the union density decline during this government as 
the ‘most seen in any comparable period’.204 Following the 1996 reforms, union 
membership figures commenced a dramatically declined. In 2000 membership 
declined to 24.7%.205 Then, membership declined to 22.4% in 2005,206 
representing an 8.7% decline over nine years since the 1996 reforms. Yet, the 
downward trend in membership had not stabilised in 2007 with membership 
falling to 19%.207 This represented one in five workers retaining membership with 
a decline of 12.1% when compared to 1996. As an alarming concern, 19% was less 
than half the density rate when compared to 21 years earlier in 1986 when 
membership stood at 46%. 
 
Peetz and Pocock believed that the membership and density decline could be 
contributed to many influences.208 They cited influences such as the loss of 
institutional protections, changes in the public sector, and increased employer 
hostility to unions. That being said, the reforms curtailed and led to discouraging 
collective agreements, promoting individual agreements, promoting anti-
unionism among the government, and led to widespread resources reduction. 
Arguably, these factors must have some instrumental influence to the weakening 
of union movement.  
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The Australian system internationally contextualised  
When comparing Australia to other jurisdictions during 1996 to 2007, the 
Australian union density had ominously declined at triple the rate of the US and 
UK (Table 5). During these 12 years, UK’s membership declined by 3.6% from 
31.2% to 27.6%, while the US declined by 2.4% from 14.5% to 12.1%. Yet, 
Australia significantly declined by 12.2% from 31.1% to 18.9%. 
 
Table 5 – Australia, UK, and US union membership 1996-2007209 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Variance 
Country                           
Australia 31.1 30.3 28.1 25.7 24.7 24.5 23.1 23.0 22.7 22.4 20.3 18.9 -12.2% 
UK 31.2 30.2 29.7 29.5 29.5 29.0 28.5 29.1 28.5 28.3 28.0 27.6 -3.6% 
US 14.5 14.1 13.9 13.9 13.4 13.3 13.3 12.9 12.5 12.5 12.0 12.1 -2.4% 
 
 
Decline in industrial action 
Table 6 demonstrates the reforms’ regulation of the unions’ ability to undertake 
industrial action. The number of disputes ranged from 202 to 767, only peaking 
in 1999 and 2002 at over 700.  
 
Table 6 – Industrial disputes from 1996-2006210 
Year No of Disputes 
Employees involved 
‘000s 
Total working days 
lost ‘000s 
1991* 1,036 1,181.6 1,610.6 
*benchmark 
1996 542 577.4 928.7 
1997 447 315.4 534.2 
1998 520 348.4 526.3 
1999 731 461.2 650.6 
2000 700 325.4 469.1 
2001 675 225.7 393.1 
2002 767 159.7 259.0 
2003 643 275.6 439.4 
2004 692 194.0 379.8 
2005 472 241.0 228.3 
2006 202 122.7 132.6 
Variance against 1996 -340 -454.7 -796.1 
Variance against 1991 -834 -1,058.9 -1,478.0 
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This equates to a 50-90% reduction on the undertaking of industrial disputes 
when compared with the arbitration system pre-1992 as a benchmark. Further, 
during this time, members’ involvement dramatically declined by 454,700. In 
1996 there were 577,400 members involved in the undertaking of industrial 
action. Yet, this significantly declined in 2006 where only 122,700 members 
were involved in industrial action. The number of lost working days also declined 
by 796,100, from 928,700 in 1996 to 132,600 in 2006. The momentous decline of 
days lost contrasts to the pre-1992 total days lost of over 1,250,000. 
 
As explained above, the 2006 Work Choices provisions further restricted the 
unions’ ability to organise legitimate industrial action during agreement-
bargaining and the impact of this is very much reflected in the data. Such 
controlling regulation is reflected in the reduction of industrial disputes 
representing only 202 in 2006.  
 
Freedom of association and agreement-making 
The reforms limited, if not removed, union members’ protection under freedom 
of association principles and labelled individual’s ‘freedom of association’ as a 
right to disassociate.211 These provisions were adopted within the policy 
objective as ‘stamping out compulsory unionism’.212 It constricted the unions’ 
effort to undertake industrial action as it was prohibited until after any 
operational collective agreement’s terms expired, and during the bargaining 
period. The timely execution of taking any industrial action was further slowed 
under Work Choices when unions were required to make an application to the 
tribunal for a secret ballot. This financially burdened the union with the bringing 
of the application and for the tribunal’s appointment of an approved agent to 
monitor the ballot. Then if industrial action was approved, the union had to give 
the employer seven days’ notice. Workers were also opposed to taking industrial 
action as the employer had the right to deduct a minimum of four hours of pay 
regardless of the time allocated to the industrial action.213 Effectively, unions 
were restricted from acting in a timely manner and were financially burdened. 
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The reforms limited unions’ involvement in the agreement bargaining process. 
With the employer’s discretionary preference for using AWAs and non-unionised 
collective agreements, unions were completely removed from bargaining. They 
were also removed from monitoring compliance on agreements that excluded its 
involvement. Thus, unions had a narrowed ability to represent and service 
members. It also dramatically impacted on workers’ ability to protect 
themselves, particular with low paid or vulnerable workers. 
 
The reforms ominously limited unions from exercising right of entry. Officials 
had to be trained as permit holders in tougher entry obligations. When 
exercising right of entry, the union had to establish reasonable grounds for any 
suspected breach, then was required to provide the employer with 24 hours’ 
notice of entry. Accessibility within the workplace was limited to a holder being 
escorted by the employer to a designated employer nominated room (generally 
small in size) with constrained access to freely communicate with members. 
 
If the union breached any of the provisions, they were exposed to increased risk 
of legal action that could now be brought in the Federal Court. The difference 
was that the State tribunals excluded financial penalties. Yet, now the Federal 
Court could prosecute and issue financial penalties in cases where a 
contravention was found.214 The action of unions and their delegates exposed 
them to a higher risk if the law was not abided with, regardless if the act was an 
exercise of international freedom of association principles or not. Further, 
unions risked being held vicariously liable for agents, officials and members or a 
group of members’ actions when they failed to meet legislative obligations. 
 
From a service to organising model 
Leading in to 1996, the union movement was structured to provide a ‘service’ 
delivery approach with unions guaranteed a role in compulsory arbitration to 
service protected members.215 Union representation in unionised-agreements 
provided assurance of value with their membership. Nonetheless, the 
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amendments altered the union movement’s traditional workplace involvement. 
Unions were no longer primarily required to be a party to collective-bargaining, 
compulsory unionism clauses were abolished, and unions could no longer retain a 
fee for providing a bargaining service to non-members.216 Essentially, the reforms 
crippled the unions’ service approach. Resulting from the constricted offering of 
service (membership decline or inability charge for services), unions’ resources 
were stretched with bargaining negotiations encouraging an individual company 
approach, rather than the organisation of collective industries.217  
 
To counteract the declined membership and the weakened workplace structure, 
the union movement was left looking for a new model to manage meagre 
resources and grow membership. In the late 1990s, the union movement adopted 
the US ‘organising’ approach to offer a more dynamic membership, activist 
involvement, overhauling recruitment strategies outside of the traditional 
domains and adopting a renewed campaigning approach in the face of 
opposition. The approach included training a younger group of organisers, which 
by 2000 had produced 300 trainees.218   
 
The ACTU secretary Greg Combet conceded that the ‘shifting resources from 
servicing to organising has had variable success’. Yet, the new approach did not 
address the declining membership or reduced collective involvement.219 Notably, 
the organising approach placed substantial weight on the union movement’s 
strengthening power of workplace delegation and activism. Such action required 
the backing of a strong union with accessible resources for recruitment on non-
union sites, and dependable workplace delegates. However, a strong union was a 
contradiction when membership numbers continued to decline, workplace 
participation was suppressed by reforms, and resources were reduced. 
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Union movement’s response 
In response to unions’ destabilisation from 1996 to 2007 by the Howard 
government, the union movement gave its support to the opposition Labor party 
led by Rudd for the 2007 election.220 Industrial relations was the most debated 
policy during the election. Unions grouped together and heavily campaigned 
with the slogan ‘Your Rights at Work: worth fighting for’ and organised one of 
the largest national rally days experienced in Australia. The unions’ campaign 
highlighted employers’ exploitation of the reforms with the removing of 
employment conditions and the unjustified termination of employees. The 
unions’ campaigning was given credit for the Labor party 2007 election win. In 
fact, Howard was only the second Prime Minister to lose his own seat during an 
election.221 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The Howard government reforms contributed to a large extent to the decline in 
union membership and industrial action. The reforms challenged the 
appropriateness of the service model approach as to whether it would support 
the longevity of the union movement. In response, the movement adjusted to 
the reforms and changing economics by adopting an ‘organising works’ model.  
 
Undoubtedly from 1996-2007, the union movement’s capacity to represent as a 
collective ‘voice’ was marginalised. The government dramatically altered the 
industrial relations framework by stripping unions and their members of union 
security, freedom of association protection, the ability to collective bargain, and 
restricted right of entry. 
 
While the government announced that the reforms were not made in the spirit 
of anti-unionism, they were a dramatic recast of the framework that 
overwhelmingly favoured the employer’s vested interests. Further, the 
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government failed to acknowledge ILO Conventions by freely executed reforms 
without any due consideration to the CEACR observations.  
 
As an accumulative effect, the reforms condensed financial resources and 
staffing resources obtainable to unions. Resources were stretched to capacity as 
unions were collectively weakened, while membership declined and prohibited 
acts for the undertaking of industrial dispute was narrowed. Limited accessibility 
to the workplace confined recruitment of new members. With such impact upon 
the union movement, it would be difficult to not conclude that the Howard 
government’s reforms were based on anti-union sentiments.  
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Chapter Four: The impact of the Rudd and Gillard 
government’s reforms on the union movement 
4.1 Introduction 
The union movement became significantly involved in the Labor party’s 2007 
election campaign under the slogan ‘Your Rights at Work’.222 Within Labor party 
ranks, many members were former unionists. The unions hoped that political 
support would manifest in influence within the party, and that a new Labor 
government would introduce favourable reforms such as the repeal of Work 
Choices and return of the arbitration system. Much to the unions’ 
disillusionment, the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) failed to provide the 
relief that they had expected given their government connections and influence. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss whether the Rudd and Gillard Labor 
government reforms continued with the strict provisions introduced by the 
former government. It will initially analyse the Labor party’s industrial relations 
policy and reforms, considering whether the government provided any relief to 
the union movement from the WR Act provisions focussing on the period 2007 to 
2013. In addition, this chapter will analyse how the FW Act measures against 
Australia’s international obligations stemming from ILO Conventions and the UN 
ICESCR. It will conclude by considering whether these reforms impacted on the 
union movement, questioning whether the reforms prejudiced union 
representation, particularly workplace right of entry, right to strike, collective 
bargaining, and collective freedom of association rights. 
 
The introduction of the FW Act stemmed from extensive consultation with 
employer associations, unions, and the wider community, in hopes the reforms 
would strike ‘an appropriate balance between the needs of business and the 
protection of employees’ (in preference to offering a period of industrial 
relations stability).223 Despite the implicit ‘fairness’ intention of the reforms, 
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relevant ABS statistical data analysed in this Chapter demonstrates a continued 
decline in union membership and industrial action statistics during 2007-2013.  
 
 
4.2 Forward with Fairness policy 2007 
The Rudd Labor party publicly embraced an industrial relations policy that 
signalled the ‘ripping up’ of Work Choices (‘Forward with Fairness’).224 To 
address the needs of both employer associations and unions, Labor compromised 
by releasing two separate policy documents focused on each group’s priorities.225 
The policy objectives provided for ‘cooperative workplace relations’ that 
balanced ‘flexibility’ for employers and ‘fairness’ for employees.226 Intrinsically, 
the reforms reflected a middle ground stance between the opposing unions and 
employer associations, rather than offering any strategic favour to the union 
movement, and did not aim to reinstate the former arbitration system.  
 
While the policy did abolish AWAs, it continued to promote individual freedom 
of association principles. It also restricted unions’ industrial activities, 
emphasising ‘clear, tough’ rules and access to remedies for those affected by 
unprotected industrial action.227 In 2007, Gillard, as Minister for Industrial 
Relations and Deputy Prime Minister, made several public statements that 
underlined the intention to be ‘tough on illegal strikes’.228 In line with this 
position, the government fundamentally retained most of the Work Choices rules 
for regulating industrial action.  
 
The policy also sought to provide some extended protection to individual 
employees, rather than to the union as a collective organised group. This 
included widening unfair dismissal provisions, introducing anti-discrimination 
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protection, and establishing a ‘safety net’ of employment conditions. Further, it 
encouraged collective bargaining between parties in ‘good faith’. However, the 
policy mostly retained the Work Choices right of entry provisions. 229  
 
Effectively, the new policy was implemented in two stages. In the first 
government sitting, Gillard tabled the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008, which was proclaimed on 
28 March 2008.230 The second stage tabled the Fair Work Bill 2008 in November 
2008.231 It is important to note that during the passing of the Fair Work 
legislation, the Opposition Coalition party continued to hold the majority vote in 
the Senate. However, as the Coalition’s election loss was aligned to voters’ 
resentment towards Work Choices, the Opposition did not make the tactical 
decision to block the FW Act passing through the Senate.232  
 
 
4.3 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)  
The objectives of the FW Act purposes: 
'a balanced framework for cooperative and productive workplace 
relations... By achieving productivity and fairness through an emphasis in 
enterprise-level collective bargaining and clear rules governing industrial 
relations'.233 
 
The aims therefore seek to strike a balance between employers and unions. Yet, 
the FW Act fails to recognise unions as distinctive organisations, encompassing 
them in the definition of ‘industry association’, which also covered informal 
                                         
229 Rudd and Gillard, n 224, p 23 
230 Julia Gillard, 'Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Bill 2008 
- second reading speech' (13 February 2008)  Minister for Education, Minister for Employment 
and Workplace Relations and Minister for Social Inclusion - Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Hansard ; and see Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with 
Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia; Canberra (Australian Government) 
231 The Fair Work Bill 2008 (FW Bill) introduced in November 2008 replaces the WR Act with FW 
Act 
232 Greg Jennett, 'Opposition backs new IR laws' (25 November 2008)  Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) News  
233 FW Act s 3(c) 
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employee groups and employer organisations.234 The following sections will 
highlight the relevant provisions that impacts on the union movement’s ability to 
freely advocate 
 
Protecting workers’ rights and industrial action 
The FW Act extends rights of protection to workers,235 particularly concerning 
minimum conditions of employment,236 and general protections (unfair 
dismissals237 and freedom of association238). The FW Act in Part 2-2 introduces 10 
statutory minimum conditions of employment called the ‘National Employment 
Standards’ (NES) as a safety net underpinning all industrial instruments (awards 
and agreements). The NES terms re-state the no disadvantage test as the ‘better 
off overall test’, as per s 193 of the FW Act. In accordance with the FW Act, 
awards are now referred to as ‘Modern Awards’. Notably, Modern Awards cannot 
be amended unless the worker would be in a better-off position as a result of 
the modification, nor could the NES be undermined at all. Previously, minimum 
employment conditions, including minimum wage increases, would be issued by 
way of an order from the tribunal after the trial of a test case, occurring every 
12 months. In contrast, the FW Act in Division 4 reviews the NES and Modern 
Awards only once every four years. However, any National system employer, 
employee or industrial organisation can apply for variation of a Modern Award at 
any time. 
 
Provisions concerning employee protection and minimum conditions of 
employment are monitored by Fair Work Australia239 (tribunal) and the Office of 
the Fair Work Ombudsman (government agent).240 The FW Act streamlines the 
industrial relations court structure by uniting the previously operational AIRC 
                                         
234 FW Act s 363 
235 FW Act s 3(e) ‘enabling fairness and representation at work and the prevention of 
discrimination by recognising the right to freedom of association…, protecting against unfair 
treatment and discrimination’   
236 FW Act s 3(b) ‘ensuring a guaranteed safety net of fair, relevant and enforceable minimum 
terms and conditions’ 
237 FW Act Part 3-2 
238 FW Act Parts 3-3 Industrial Action, and 3-4 Right to Strike 
239 The tribunal was renamed Fair Work Commission on 5 January 2013  
240FW Act Chapter 5 powers of administration, compliance and enforcement  
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and Industrial Relations Court into one tribunal. Part 3-1 of the FW Act defines 
‘general protection’ for employees.241 Part 3-2 of the FW Act provides employee 
protection from unfair dismissal, which obligations are significantly more 
onerous on employers when compared to the WR Act. Unfair dismissal provisions 
in s 381 embodies a ‘fair go all round’ principle242 to be utilised by the tribunal in 
the determination whether the employer’s decision to terminate an employee 
was ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’.243 
 
A further objective of the FW Act (s 3(c)) abolished individual agreements, 
opting instead to protect employment conditions on the basis that parties: 
 '…cannot longer be undermined by the making of statutory individual 
employment agreements of any kind given that such agreements can 
never be part of a fair workplace system'. 
 
The FW Act extends worker advocacy powers to the tribunal as an ‘employee's 
voice' to protect low paid employees under the 'public interest' provisions.244 The 
government agency can also act as a worker advocate, enabling it to replace the 
union in underpayment of wages matters. It was not until 2012 amendments245 
that s 44 of the FW Act acknowledges the union as a party who could bring an 
application to the tribunal regarding a breach of the NES. 
 
Part 3-3 of the FW Act regulates the taking of industrial action by establishing 
when ‘protected industrial action’ is permitted, which in effect is restricted to 
                                         
241FW Act ss 340 ‘Protection’ from being adversely treated from exercising a workplace right; 344 
‘undue influence or pressure; and 351 ‘Discrimination’ 
242 The term ‘fair go all round’ was termed in Re Loty and Holloway v Australian Workers' Union 
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244FW Act ss 425 public interest to ‘suspend protected industrial action’; and 532(1) ‘Orders that 
the FWC may make... in the public interest’ to put the employee or union in the ‘same 
position’ as if the employer had complied’ 
245Fair Work Amendment Act 2012 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia; Canberra (Australian 
Government); and FW Act s 539 applications for orders for contraventions of civil remedy 
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the bargaining period for a single-enterprise collective agreement.246 Once the 
agreement is made, no industrial action can be taken. Pursuant to s 414(4), 
protected industrial action also requires stringent notice requirements alerting 
the other party. These provisions only slightly expand upon the list of permitted 
circumstances provided by the WR Act.247 Sections 409 to 412 prohibits industrial 
action (unprotected) for Greenfields Agreements, pattern bargaining, and multi-
enterprise agreements.248 In a significant deviation from Work Choices, the 
requirement to deduct a minimum of four hours of earnings for industrial action 
has been removed. The FW Act ss 416 and 470 prohibits the employer from 
paying wages during any industrial action,249 including partial bans.250 
 
Workplace right of entry 
The right of entry provisions are fundamentally a re-enactment of Work Choices. 
Part 3-4 of the FW Act marginally broadens the unions’ ability to exercise their 
right of entry to investigate suspected non-compliant workplaces for breaches 
that affected union members,251 to hold discussions with employees who are 
covered under the union’s rules,252 or to investigate safety breaches.253 A 
significant departure from the WR Act is the reinstatement of the permit 
holder’s abilities to hold broad discussions with workers. The WR Act prohibited 
union access to the workplace if there were operational non-union collective 
agreements or AWAs in place. Here, a permit holder may enter the workplace to 
hold discussions with workers provided that just one worker is covered by the 
union’s rules.254 
 
                                         
246FW Act ss 408-11 
247FW Act s 409 Employee claim action permitting industrial action relating to for advancing 
claim during bargaining, unlawful terms, organised against the employer, [or] undertaken by 
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248FW Act ss 412-3 
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If the employer refuses access to the union official, the union then can apply for 
a tribunal order granting access.255 This procedural requirement significantly 
impedes on the union’s ability to gather evidence of statutory breaches, is 
costly, and results in time delays. In Hogan v Riley256, the Full Court of the 
Federal Court upheld permit holders’ rights to enter a workplace without notice 
on the grounds of safety compliance suspicions. While in the first instance the 
matter was dealt with in a timely manner by the tribunal, on appeal the matter 
navigated the legal system for over three years.  
 
However, the tribunal did not always afford unions freedom to access the 
workplace. In Vlach v Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd257 the tribunal rejected 
the union’s order application. The union sought to access the employer’s 
premises to investigate allegations of an unfair dismissal several months after 
the event. The tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction to grant such an 
order under these circumstances. 
 
Fair Work system amendments 
After the commencement of the FW Act several Senate inquiries led to further 
amendments. In 2011 a Senate inquiry258 focused on the FW Act’s application in 
the textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) industry. The ACTU submitted that 
employers of outworkers in sweatshops would close their premises on receiving a 
24-hour notice of intention for a union’s right of entry,259 to avoid union 
presence in the workplace.  Consequently, the Labor government passed 
legislative amendments allowing permit holders to access TCF workplaces 
without providing the 24-hour notice.260 
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Further amendments in 2012 broaden the unions’ ability to extend the minimum 
right of entry provisions in Part 3-4 of the FW Act when negotiating terms of 
collective agreements.261 
 
In June 2013 final amendments262 were made by the Labor government before it 
lost office in September 2013. These reforms extend the right of entry provisions 
in favour of the unions with effect from 1 January 2014, including making the 
workplace’s nominated lunch room the default venue for workplace union 
meetings. Other amendments that obliges the employer to provide reasonable 
accommodation263 and transport264 to permit holders when the union visits 
remote workplaces at the employer’s expense, attracted significant criticism. 
 
Collective agreement-making 
Part 2-4 of the FW Act redefines a collective agreement as an ‘enterprise 
agreement’. It introduces a set of reforms which were subsequently described by 
Breen Creighton as ‘an attenuated return to collectivism’.265 These provisions 
outline minimum content requirements that must be included in an agreement 
before the tribunal would approve it.266 Content must include consultative 
mechanisms, workplace flexibility, employment conditions, and rates of pay. 
The FW Act also extends new bargaining representative rights to unions as a 
party involved in the agreement-making process. Sections 236 and 237 
introduces a significant reform whereby unions could compel employers to enter 
into bargaining for agreement-making if a Majority Support Determination could 
be obtained.267 One of the fundamental changes contained in s 228 of the FW Act 
compels an employer to negotiate with bargaining representatives in ‘good 
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faith’. Failure of any parties to abide by the good faith bargaining obligations 
could result in a tribunal order. For example, if the employer refuses, the union 
could seek a bargaining order from the tribunal forcing it to bargain. The 
employer’s failure to follow a tribunal order could result in civil penalties.268  
 
Section 174(3) of the FW Act nominates the union as the ‘default bargaining 
representative’ for employees under new enterprise agreements. This would 
apply even if the workplace only employed one union member. A Greenfields 
Agreement is defined as an agreement for an employer with a new enterprise 
who has not yet engaged any employees, under which one or more relevant 
unions may cover the future employees. Section 172(4) reinstates the union as a 
compulsory bargaining representative in negotiations.269 As the bargaining 
representative, the union is also covered by the enterprise agreement, meaning 
that it could enforce terms or commence legal proceedings for any breach.   
 
The default bargaining representative provisions significantly narrows the 
circumstances in which the union could not be a party to negotiations for an 
enterprise agreement to two situations: where no union members are employed 
and the employer did not appoint the union as their bargaining representative, 
or when all union members at the workplace exercised the right to appoint an 
alternative non-union bargaining representative.270 Nevertheless, these reforms 
failed to return the union to its position as a compulsory agreement-making 
party as it had been during the arbitration era. 
 
 
4.4 Criticisms of the Labor government reforms 
Forward with Fairness and the FW Act reforms fell short of the professed 
objective of ‘ripping up Work Choices and creating a fairer, simpler system’.271 
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The government speeches signalled that Work Choices would be ‘eradicated’ or 
‘dead and buried’. Yet, in effect some Work Choices provisions, such as the right 
to entry, elimination of the adversarial system, proscribed industrial action, and 
abolishment of the security and preference clauses, were retained by Labor. 
Consequently, these reforms pleased no one. The union movement criticised272 
the government for not repealing Work Choices, pushing the government ‘to go 
much further in undoing the effects of Howard’s 11 years in office’.273 
 
In contrast, employer groups274 sought to retain the Work Choices regime. They 
vocalised their disapproval of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ‘for constraining 
employer flexibility and choice, emboldening unions, [and] increasing labour 
costs’.275 Employer associations held that the FW Act created uncertainty and 
instability. Further concerns included the extended freedom of association 
(rights broadening representation, advocacy and consultation), and unions’ 
exploitation of the right of entry provisions to disguise ‘discussions’276 for 
marketing and recruitment purposes. 
 
Richard Clancy from the Victorian Employers' Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, stated that the Labor government reforms ‘very much tilted the 
balance in favour of employees’,277 noting the increase of 10,000 unfair dismissal 
claims per year. This led to a significant increase in ‘go away money’278 paid by 
employers to dismissed workers in order to avoid the costs of defending 
themselves before a tribunal. In support of employers, Shadow Industrial 
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Relations Minister Abetz, stated that these provisions merely provided workers 
with an opportunity to ‘milk some more money out of an employer’.279 
 
While the right of entry provisions were initially unchanged from Work Choices, 
Fair Work Amendment Act 2013 amendments nominate the lunch room as the 
default meeting room. They also make employers financially obligated to fund 
unions when they attended workplaces in remote areas. This was strongly 
objected to and criticised by employer associations. The Australian Industry 
Group (AiG) opposing submissions to the Senate highlighted ‘lunch rooms (and 
other break areas) are used by all employees, including those who are not union 
members and those who do not wish to participate in union discussions.’ In 
support of this argument, AiG submitted that only 13% of private sector 
employees were affiliated with a union. Therefore, this provision impedes on the 
privacy of the majority of employees (non-unions members) that sought to rest 
in the lunch room.280 
 
Sheldon and Thornthwaite evaluated the Fair Work Review 2012 from an 
employer’s perspective. They noted a strong consensus of criticism of the Fair 
Work framework amongst employers, who were disgruntled about the bargaining 
provisions that limited the employer’s flexibility, competing unions embroiled in 
controversy within the workplace, and increased workplace union presence that 
decreased productivity. In essence, employer associations believed that the 
increased union presence at the workplace led to increased labour costs. A 
particular focus was on the lack of ‘reasonably priced’ labour in the resources 
sector.281 
 
The leading employer associations made Submissions to the Senate for 
consideration in the Fair Work 2012 Review. 282 Most criticised the FW Act 
bargaining agreement provisions as a ‘weakening of the employer’s freedom to 
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contract’. As the legislation enhances the unions’ bargaining power, prolonged 
negotiations resulted in reduced agreement options and flexibility. This position 
was particularly evident in relation to Greenfields Agreements, in which the 
union is legislated as a compulsory bargaining representative. Here, employers 
alleged that such compulsory provisions only promoted ‘outbreaks of union 
militancy’.283 
 
In the lead up to the 2013 election, the Australian Mines & Metals Association 
released an extensive reform submission entitled ‘Trade union access to 
workplaces’.284 The report strongly criticised the government reforms as 
‘continued efforts to place unions between employers and [their] employees 
irrespective of their [workers’] wishes’. The reforms resulted in unwarranted 
disruptions in the workplace by union officials, difficulties ascertaining the 
covering union for employee groups, the unions’ undesirable abilities to expand 
industrial action scope in agreements, and increased aggression in the workplace 
by competing unions at the expensive of productivity. Predominantly, employers 
sought a framework that returned the WR Act provisions for agreement-making, 
right of entry, and regulated industrial action. 
 
 
4.5 International obligations 
This section will consider the FW Act provisions alongside Australia’s 
international treaties and obligations. Particular consideration will be given to 
CEACR appraisal of Australia’s compliance with ILO Conventions No. 87 and 
No. 98. In light of Convention No. 87, the CEACR noted that the FW Act retention 
of the WR Act provisions regarding the ‘absence of protection for industrial 
action’285 for multi-business agreements,286 pattern bargaining,287 and rights to 
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strike;288 and prohibited negotiations was on ‘unlawful terms’.289 They observed 
that the ‘right to strike is one of the essential means available to workers and 
their organizations for the promotion and protection of their economic and 
social interests’. Therefore, the CEACR requested the government ‘to take all 
appropriate measures… with a view to bringing them into full conformity with 
the Convention’.290  
 
Regarding the right to strike procedure, the CEACR also noted the ACTU 
concerns relating to time delays and reported frustrations, particularly s 459 of 
the FW Act requirements for majority strike secret ballot. The CEACR requested 
the government to observe ongoing outcomes of the application of the right to 
strike procedure to ensure workers and unions are ‘not restricted by unduly 
challenging and complicated’ procedures with ‘excessive delays’.291   
 
While not arising in the CEACR observations of Convention No. 87, McCrystal also 
questioned conformity regarding strike action in relation to prohibited 
‘coercion’292 under FW Act s 343. As coercion could be extended to workers or 
bargaining representatives coercing other workers by threatening or acting upon 
peaceful picketing during protected industrial action, picketing may be 
considered prohibited. Thus, McCrystal noted that workers could lose their right 
to any protected industrial action as ‘failure to comply with the… provisions will 
almost automatically constitute coercion’293 as an unlawful act.  
 
Concerning Convention No. 98 for the right of parties to voluntarily bargain 
collectively with protection from acts of interference, the CEACR referred to the 
FW Act s 172 limitation on protected industrial action pursuant to lawful content 
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during agreement-making.294 Lawful terms295 were limited to ‘matters pertaining 
to the employment relationship’.296 Thus, claims for the deduction of union 
membership fees from workers’ wages, compulsory bargaining fees,297 right of 
entry,298 wider socio-economic interests, or adjustments to unfair dismissal 
qualification terms,299 were considered impermissible claims or unlawful content 
and prohibited for the undertaking of industrial action.300 According to McCrystal, 
these provisions had ‘the capacity to undermine the right to strike in practice 
because it increases the cost and time involved with ensuring strict compliance 
with the legal formalities’.301 Further, both unions and workers may be held 
liable for civil penalties for undertaking any act of unprotected industrial 
action.302 The CEACR Direct Request of 2014 recommended that the government 
should reconsider these legislative restrictions and ‘broaden the scope of 
collective bargaining’.303  
 
FW Act s 470(1) prohibits the employer from paying wages if the worker has 
participated in industrial action. The CEACR had made objections to this 
provision and similar mandatory non-payment provisions since 1998, preferring 
the involved parties to negotiate such terms304 rather than being bound by a 
statutory provision. 
 
                                         
294 FW Act s 172 
295 FW Act s 409, employee claim action ‘organised or engaged in for the purpose of supporting 
or advancing claims in relation to the agreement that are only about, or are reasonably 
believed to only be about, permitted matters’ 
296 FW Act s 172(1) 
297 FW Act s 353 
298 FW Act ss 194, meaning of unlawful terms; and 195, meaning of discriminatory 
299 FW Act s 194 unlawful regarding Part 3-2 unfair dismissal periods of employment  
300 ILO, 'Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2013: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98) - Australia' (2014)  International Labour Conference  
301 McCrystal, n 54, p 266 
302 FW Act s 417 
303 ILO, n 300 
304 ILO, n ; ILO, 'Report of the CEACR, 86th session - Report III (1A)' (1998) International Labour 
Conference ,[224]; and ILO, n 285, p 58 
71 
 
The UN CESCR also measured Art 8 of the ICESCR Convention against the 
multiple-employer305 and pattern bargaining306 agreements related to the FW Act 
provisions prohibiting strike action. The UN CESCR recommended that the 
government ‘lift the restriction on pattern bargaining [and] multiple-employer 
agreements’ regarding prohibited industrial action because ‘in law and practice, 
[as] obstacles and restrictions to [a worker’s] right to strike, [they] are 
inconsistent with the provisions’ of ICESCR Convention.307 
 
As discussed above, specific provisions of the FW Act have failed to comply with 
ICESCR Convention and ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98. The FW Act has 
placed burdensome constraints on workers’ rights to strike including strict 
procedural steps and prohibition of the payment of wages during industrial 
action. Any industrial acts committed outside of these parameters would be 
considered unlawful action, and could potentially result in civil penalties. 
However, the FW Act is failing to conform to Australia’s international 
obligations. To resolve this, the government must undertake necessary reforms 
that will advance workers’ workplace rights. 
 
 
4.6 Impact on the union movement 
Despite the hopes of the union movement, the Labor government failed to 
provide full relief from the Work Choices anti-union provisions. Yet, the 
government did not hide the fact that the union movement would not obtain the 
desired support. In 2007 Rudd stated: 
‘it was not the job of a Labor Government to help arrest union membership’ as 
‘trade unions will survive or die based on their ability to compete - that 
means being able to offer working Australians services to represent them 
which they can't obtain elsewhere’.308 
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The government openly confirmed the retention of the ‘tough’ laws on industrial 
action, right of entry, and freedom of association provisions. Further, it 
extended protection to small businesses,309 providing special consideration with 
unfair dismissal claims. Such provisions restrict the unions’ fight and the 
circumstances in which the union movement can be visibly seen or heard by the 
community as an advocate for workers’ economic and social interests. 
 
Modern Awards and NES were introduced alongside the FW Act. Effectively, 
these conditions minimise the necessity for employers to engage in collective 
bargaining, as employers would prefer to adopt the terms of a Modern Award 
than negotiate a collective agreement. The FW Act provided that Modern Awards 
are reviewed every four years,310 rather than the former 12 month reviews. The 
legislation of the NES impacts on unions by reducing public eminence and the 
capacity to advance workers’ social interests.  
 
Freedom of association 
The government resisted adopting the international principles of freedom of 
association. Freedom of association was broadly dealt with in the Objects of the 
FW Act,311 however it narrowed such rights to the context of fairness, right to 
representation, and prevention of discrimination.312 What was completely absent 
from the FW Act Objects was any reference to union recognition. The approach 
of the FW Act is instead to confer rights to an individual ‘as the individual is at 
the centre of the freedom’.313 Thus, unions as organised groups are not afforded 
any rights. 
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Individual rights are bestowed in Part 3-1 of the FW Act, which protects workers 
from anti-union discrimination based on involvement in industrial action.314 A 
shortcoming of this provision is its failure to protect a collective union. 
Previously under Work Choices, the tribunal determined that such collective 
protection was provided for under the WR Act freedom of association 
provisions.315 However these broad provisions were replaced by the narrow FW 
Act s 341 ‘workplace rights’ and s 342 ‘adverse action’ provisions.  
 
With the unions adopting the organising model,316 a union official within the 
workplace is protected by adverse action against discrimination, yet failed to 
offer any comprehensive protection.317 The High Court of Australia adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the causation element as an adverse action breach. A 
worker is protected if adversely treated because they were also engaged as a 
union official who may or may not be involved in industrial activities.318 The High 
Court rejected a broader reading of this provision on the basis that if the causal 
link of ‘because’ could not be established, then if protection was afforded in the 
capacity of union official such protection would provide an advantage not 
enjoyed by other workers. Further, the proscribed reason for action by the 
employer must be the immediate or operative reason for the conduct for this 
breach to be made out.319 
 
Lambropoulos and Wynn criticised the High Court approach, concerned that 
protection may not be afforded to a union official where their position conflicts 
with their position as an employee.320 Furthermore, when undertaking 
unprotected industrial action, unions jeopardised breaching provisions that could 
potentially lead either to civil penalties, or have right of entry permits revoked.  
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Right to strike 
Part 3-1 of the FW Act ‘general protection’ and Part 3-4 ‘right to strike’ have 
significantly narrowed the worker’s abilities to exercise a right to strike. The 
provisions define a list of approved circumstances under which the worker may 
undertake action, such as under enterprise agreements and during the 
bargaining phase, and only when prescribed procedures are strictly followed. In 
these narrow circumstances strike action may be considered ‘protected 
industrial action’. These restrictions expose unions to significant risks including 
limited protection for workers (from being victimised or discriminated against), 
tribunal orders, and civil penalties stemming from unprotected industrial action. 
 
The reforms continue to adopt the heavily regulated WR Act provisions. Table 7 
illustrates that from 2007-2012, the number of industrial disputes continued to 
decline, ranging from 135 to 236 disputes per year when compared to the pre-
1992 arbitration system of 1,036 disputes. Effectively, the number of industrial 
disputes occurring was reduced by 70% to 95% during the Fair Work reforms. 
Further, the number of union members involved in industrial disputes continued 
to significantly decline ranging from 36,000 to 172,000 members per year. Such 
reductions are substantial when compared to members involved in the 1980s and 
1990s, which ranged from 608,000, peaking at 1,181,600 members. 
 
Table 7 – Industrial disputes 2007-2013321 
Year No of Disputes Employees involved ‘000s 
Total working days 
lost ‘000s 
1991* 1,036 1,181.6 1,610.6 
*benchmark 
2007 135 36.0 49.7 
2008 177 172.9 196.5 
2009 236 89.3 132.7 
2010 227 54.8 126.6 
2011 192 134.4 241.5 
2012 204 143.3 273.2 
2013 219 132.2 131.0 
Variance 
against 2007 +84 +96.2 +81.3 
Variance 
against 1991 -817 -1,049.4 -1,479.6 
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Another significant impact on the union movement are the time delays and costs 
required to satisfy the procedural requirements for undertaking protected 
industrial action. Here, unions incur significant expenses when organising an 
industrial dispute. Unions primarily conduct strike action to draw attention to 
the significance of an issue, as it was the only remaining option that signalled 
the strength and ‘the willingness of the union to impose economic costs on the 
employer if its demands are [were] not met’.322 As a consequence of being faced 
with difficulties in satisfying the requirements of protected industrial action, 
unions are undertaking short unprotected industrial action, yet limited the 
action to less working days lost. By taking short periods of unprotected industrial 
action, unions minimise the risks associated with unlawful strike action.323 
 
The process of seeking a ballot to ascertain the majority’s support of an 
industrial action led to an imposed timing obstacle and unjustified expense to 
unions. The undertaking of the ballot undermines the union movement’s 
autonomy. In effect, these provisions remove the union movement and workers’ 
right to freely advance members’ interests. Yet, while the impact of the reforms 
has significantly narrowed the unions’ ability to organise lawful industrial action, 
the failure of the unions to abide by the legislation has resulted in negative 
media attention. More significantly, it resulted in judicial dissent of the union 
movement’s action.  
 
In 2011, the volatile construction industry experienced drawn out industrial 
action by the CFMEU with significant media coverage and community picketing 
as negotiations broke down at the Myer Emporium Grocon development in 
Victoria, and children’s hospital project in Queensland. The CFMEU involved in 
the children’s hospital project was issued with an unusually long six months’ 
order by the tribunal against the taking of any industrial action. The union was 
also fined $400,000 for work stoppages. 
 
                                         
322 David Peetz, ‘Industrial Conflict with Awards, Choices and Fairness’ in Creighton and Forsyth, 
n 22, pp 173-4 
323 Ibid, p 180 
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In a landmark decision against unions, in March 2014 the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision against the CFMEU’s coordination of condoned unlawful action 
in the Myer Emporium dispute that ran for 16 working days. The Court handed 
down a fine of $1.25 million with 30 convictions of criminal contempt of court. 
In his decision, Justice Cavanough stated that the conduct of the CFMEU 
amounted to ‘perverse and obstinate resistance to authority’ as the union 
continued behaviours that demonstrated ‘the pattern of repeated defiance’ of 
the Court.324  
 
Effectively, the right to strike provisions have dramatically narrowed the union 
movement’s ability to organise timely protected action. Yet, some unions are 
prepared to breach provisions and risk tribunal imposed civil penalties to 
advance workers’ social and economic interests.  
 
Decline in union membership 
The union membership decline during the FW Act did not match the trend 
experienced during WR Act. Yet, it could be said that the statistics have 
bottomed-out. Table 8 shows that the period of the Labor government from 2007 
to 2013 marginally stabilised membership density with 18.9% in 2007 to 17% in 
2013, an average loss of 0.32% in membership each year, being less when 
compared to the 1.02% average loss during the Howard government. As such, the 
reforms failed to assist in the union movement’s growth strategy to recruit or 
increase density. 
 
Table 8 – Union membership 2007-2013325 
Year Males ('000) % Females ('000) % Persons ('000) % 
2007 937.1 20 759.3 18 1,696.4 18.9 
2008 940.8 19 812.2 19 1,752.9 18.9 
2009 989.4 20 845.7 19 1,835.1 19.7 
2010 930.3 18 857.6 19 1,787.8 18.3 
2011 976.5 18 858.2 18 1,834.7 18.4 
2012 939.8 18 900.6 19 1,840.4 18.2 
2013 884.8 16 862.7 18 1,747.6 17.0 
Variance -52.3 -4% +103.4 +/-0% +51.2 -1.9% 
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While union membership density slightly declined, member numbers increased. 
During the last year of WR Act in 2007 there were 1.696 million total members, 
while in the most recent recorded year of FW Act in 2012 there were 1.840 
million total, which then declined by nearly 100,000 in 2013 to 1,747,600. This is 
an increase of 51,200 members or 3% over a period of seven years. That being 
said, the 3% increase is not equivalent to the represented increase of the total 
workforce. During this period, the number of persons in the workforce increased 
by 1,269,300 workers or 14% from 8,989,200 in 2007 to 10,258,500.326  
 
While private sector membership had declined from 13.7% to 12.0% from 2007 to 
2013, public sector membership had slightly increased from 41.1% to 41.7%. 
Notably, the public sector membership peaked to 43.4% in 2012. The majority of 
the public sector are employed by the State governments where the jurisdictions 
are bound by State laws. The slight increase in the public sector membership 
may be a consequence of most State government offices being held by the 
Coalition party. Particular during 2012 in Queensland and New South Wales, the 
Coalition State governments implemented dramatic restructures and 
redundancies across all functions, particularly the large health sector. Thus, 
unions received considerable positive publicity as a collective voice defending 
employment and termination conditions.  
 
An impact on union membership that would not yet be represented in the above 
figures was the substantial negative media publicity received from 2012 to 2014. 
Further to the abovementioned Court decisions on unlawful industrial action by 
the CFMEU, former Labor Member of Parliament and National Secretary of the 
Health Service Union Craig Thomson was imprisoned in 2014 due to fraud and 
theft charges relating to misuse of union funds.327 Consequently, the Health 
Services Union was suspended by the ACTU who subsequently set up a union 
governance and accountability panel. Other damaging publicity involved union 
leaders misusing ‘slush funds’ in the Australian Workers Union, and the alleged 
                                         
326 Ibid 
327 In 14 March 2014 Craig Thomson was found guilty of 65 dishonesty charges over the misuse of 
union funds for $24,538 AUD 
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‘thuggery’ of a construction union picket line by the CFMEU.328 Recently in 2014, 
Prime Minister Abbott ordered a Royal Commission to investigate union 
corruption and misuse of funds, which has involved former Prime Minister Gillard 
being questioned.329 
 
The Australian system internationally contextualised  
Table 9 shows that UK declined in union membership density by 2.3% from 27.9% 
in 2007 to 25.6% in 2013. Australia declined by 1.9% from 18.2% to 17.0%, yet 
rose to 19% in 2009. The US declined by 0.8% from 12.1% to 11.3%, yet also 
peaked at 12.4% in 2008.  
 
Table 9 – Australia, UK, and US union membership 2007-2013330 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Variance 
Country                
Australia 
18.9 18.9 19.7 18.3 18.4 18.2 17.0 -1.9% 
UK  
27.9 27.1 27.1 26.4 25.6 25.8 25.6 -2.3% 
US 
12.1 12.4 12.3 11.9 11.8 11.3 11.3 -0.5% 
 
 
When comparing Australia against the UK and US, the UK experienced the 
highest decline. However, it could be proposed that Australia and the US had 
much lower starting levels and thus may have bottomed out, with limited further 
declines expected. 
 
In operation, the FW Act has not provided an avenue or strategy for the union 
movement to increase recruitment initiatives that would create a surge in 
membership numbers. In the private sector, the union movement is considered a 
minority group. The FW Act provides unions with the opportunity to return to the 
bargaining table as employers could no longer refuse to bargain with unions. This 
by no means guarantees unions a bargaining representative position as workers 
                                         
328Janis Bailey and David Peetz, 'Unions and collective bargaining in Australia in 2012' (2012) 
55(3) Journal of industrial relations 404, pp 404, and 410-11  
329 Jason Om, 'Gillard denies misusing union money' (10 Septmeber 2014)  Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) News   
330 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n 79; ABS, n 79; and Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills and Office of National Statistics, n 79 
79 
 
could appoint a non-union bargaining representative. Ultimately, the FW Act 
fails to prioritise collective bargaining, giving preference to individualism and 
statutory industrial instruments. 
 
Collective bargaining 
The FW Act scales back some of the WR Act decollective provisions, yet fails to 
reinstate the unions’ favoured compulsory unionism terms. Further, it legislates 
the NES minimum conditions and Modern Awards. Thus, the bargaining of 
collective agreements was seen as a top-up to these minimum conditions, and 
agreements were viewed by employers as not being fundamentally required. 
While these reforms provide unions with restricted access to the bargaining 
table that was closed off by the WR Act, they still promote individual bargaining 
rather than a collective approach.  
 
The FW Act restrictions for the undertaking of industrial action minimise unions’ 
ability to ‘voice’ the advancement of workers’ social and economic interests 
during collective bargaining. The union movement:  
‘surrendering the capacity to take protected industrial action appears to 
be the price to be paid for entry into the low-paid bargaining stream and 
the capacity to require employers to bargain at an industry or multi-
enterprise level’.331 
 
Rather than undertaking industrial action when parties are in dispute, the 
tribunal could impose a workplace determination order332 that would bind parties 
to a resolution for the term that was in dispute. Further, the union was not a 
secure party to agreements. While unions are legislated as the ‘default’ 
bargaining representative, they could also be displaced from this position.333 This 
is because an employee had the right to appoint their own bargaining 
representative, which may or may not be a union official. Effectively, this 
distracts from the ‘collective’ bargaining approach to agreement-making with 
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333 FW Act s 176(1)(c) 
80 
 
the FW Act encouraging an ‘individual’ bargaining approach, allowing multiple 
potential bargaining representatives. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The Rudd and Gillard government largely achieved their 2007 policy intentions 
for the industrial relations sphere aimed at ‘fairness’. Yet, they questionably 
also anticipated a ‘cooperative workplace’, which is difficult to impose on 
incompatible parties. As publicly stated by Rudd, the government would not 
assist the union movement. Consequently, the union movement’s optimism for a 
return of the arbitration system, with majority workforce representation, would 
not prevail. In contrast to the union demoralising reforms of the WR Act, the 
Labor government reforms resulted in minor gains for the union movement. They 
provided a framework that widened unions’ powers to represent, ability to 
bargain as representative, access to the workplace, and extended protection to 
individual members. These slight gains were highly criticised by employer 
groups. That being said, these reforms continue to fail to underwrite 
predominant international obligations. Furthermore, the FW Act did not halt the 
union membership decline to 17% in 2013. While actual member numbers slightly 
increased, this did not equate to the number of persons entering the workforce. 
 
It could be said that in symmetry with the functions of the mediator, the Fair 
Work system drew a line between the demands from unions against the opposing 
position of the employers, and remained impartially removed from any vested 
parties’ interests. 
 
  
81 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion – the impact of law 
reforms on the union movement 
5.1 Introduction 
The beginning of this dissertation introduces a government’s sway over the 
power struggle between employees and unions, with employers. Before 1996, 
unions were a compulsory party to this relationship. Yet, recent reforms over-
regulating the framework under the guise of enhancing individual freedoms have 
detached unions from the employment relationship. This dissertation provides a 
chronicle analysis of these reforms. Consideration has been presented on the 
machinations of power and how changes in industrial systems through policy, 
rhetoric, and legislation have ultimately undone the equitable power 
relationship between the employer and the employee. In effect, the reforms 
systematic chipped away at the function of unions as the protectors of individual 
rights and freedoms, thereby constraining unions to representing a minority of 
the workforce. This final chapter provides a summary of the research and key 
findings of the impacts of law reforms on the union movement. To conclude this 
evaluation, it will review the reforms that shifted freedom of association to 
individual disassociation, and collectivism to individualism. Additionally, ABS 
statistical data will examine declines in industrial action and union membership.  
 
 
5.2 Models and approaches 
The arbitration system encouraged a ‘service’ model operating within 
‘corporatism’. Unions flourished from compulsory membership. Union 
membership represented a majority of the workplace, thus strengthening unions 
to influence the government and employers. Governance and membership 
reflected a ‘logic of influence’ approach.334 
 
The 1996 reforms introduced a decentralisation period with the WR Act, 
followed by the FW Act. During this time, the union movement shifted into 
                                         
334 See Rae Cooper and Greg Patmore, 'Trade Union Organising and Labour History' (2002) (83) 
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‘pluralism’, adopting an ‘organising works’ model. This model focuses on 
workplace mobilisation and interactive member involvement, consequently 
reflecting a ‘logic of membership’ approach. Member participation and activism 
became central to the unions’ strategic response to reforms. This enabled unions 
to avoid the characterisation and perception of becoming an external third party 
(inherent to the servicing approach) by focusing on direct worker mobilisation, 
organisational structures, and delegates.335 That being the said, the adopted 
model and strategies did not counteract or overcome the impacting limitation of 
the changing regulations as anticipated by stabilising, let alone grow, a declining 
union membership. 
 
 
5.3 Industrial relations systems 
1904-1996 arbitration system 
From Australia’s early industrialisation beginnings, the union movement had 
been an influencing actor within the regulation of the labour market during the 
period of ‘labourism’. The 1904 arbitration system meant that unions were a 
secure party (compulsory unionism), which represented a majority of the 
workplace and a recognised party. The system had minimal regulations regarding 
the unions’ ability to organise members, access the workplace, negotiate better 
conditions, or undertake industrial action. Unions relied heavily on the 
arbitration system to provide security to somewhat freely function with the 
power to threaten or take strike action at will. 
 
1996-2006 Workplace Relations – Coalition government 
In 1996, the Howard government favoured capital growth and international 
competition over labour and was disinterested in union influence. The party 
policy and objectives led to the WR Act and Work Choices reforms, which 
eradicated the arbitration system. The reforms were heavily criticised by unions 
and academics336 as being ‘anti-union’ as they aimed to eliminate unions from 
the workplace.  
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As the government opposed collectivism, individualism reforms implemented 
non-union agreements and abolished union recognition. Legislation supported 
the employer’s right to refuse to enter into a collective agreement with unions. 
Statistical evidence supports that these reforms impacted on the union 
movement’s ability to function with dramatic decline in union membership and 
strike action. They also heavy regulated the unions’ ability to organise and 
access the workplace. Civil penalties provisions were introduced for breaching 
regulations that could be brought against the union and its officials. In response, 
unions fought against the Howard government by influencing public opinion 
during the 2007 election.337  
 
2007-2013 Fair Work – Labor government 
The Rudd Labor government proclaimed a ‘ripping up’ of Workplace Relations. 
Unions had hoped for reforms that would return arbitration and compulsory 
unionism as a reward for their electoral campaigning. Yet, Rudd denounced 
support of the unions. 338 In effect, the ripping up of Workplace Relations was 
‘exaggerated’,339 being more correctly identified as a continuation of the 
majority of WR Act system. Fair Work was criticised by employee advocacies, 
minority political party, 340 unions,341 and academics.342 Furthermore, the Greens 
party343 and unions344 criticisms the reforms as being a lost opportunity for the re-
introduction of the arbitration system. Employers also criticised the reforms. 
Steve Knott, Employer Association CEO,345 claimed the reforms gave unions ‘their 
greatest increase in power in more than a century’. Consequently, neither 
employer groups nor unions were satisfied with the government’s balanced 
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approach. Indeed, unions were more restricted from collective bargaining 
advocacy because of the expanded safety net (NES and Modern Awards). These 
minimum conditions were set without union influence,346 giving unions less 
activism opportunities. Failure to recognise unions also continued. However, 
there was some elimination of the WR Act, such as AWAs and employers could no 
longer refuse to bargain with the union when there was majority support. 
Overall, the reforms slightly deregulated union centralised functioning, including 
workplace right of entry, industrial action, and collective bargaining.  
 
2007-2013 Fair Work – Coalition government 
Elected in September 2013, the Abbott Coalition government policy Improve the 
Fair Work laws347 quickly abolished the Labor government 2013 amendments348 
favouring unions. These included the employer’s obligation to pay for officials 
travel and accommodation for remote workplace right of entry. However, an 
obstacle for the government was the inability to freely pass reforms, as the 
Green and Labor parties held Senate control until July 2014.349 It has been said 
that Abbott is being too cautious considering the public backlash and heavy 
criticism of Workplace Relations. He has been criticised by business groups that 
the delays in making strategic reforms are taking too long.350 Yet, the 
government has strategically taken two tactical steps to ensure future reforms 
encounter minimal resistance. First, in February 2014 Abbott announced a Royal 
Commission351 into unions to investigate alleged financial irregularities, 
governance and corruption.352 If these claims are substantiated, this may result 
in some retribution for the union movement. Second, the government appointed 
a Productivity Commission to review the economic and industrial relations, 
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which is due to report in 2015.353 It has yet to be determined how far the Abbott 
government’s proposed reforms will alter the industrial relations laws. At a 
minimum, tougher regulations will be introduced further restraining the union 
movement.  
 
 
5.4 Union membership decline  
The 1996-2013 reforms correlated with a decline of 15.7% in union membership 
density, with the most significant decline during the Workplace Relations period. 
Membership stood at 32.7% in 1995, falling to a record low of 17.0% in 2013. As 
evident in Figure 1, union membership has almost halved in approximately 18 
years following the abolishment of the arbitration system.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Summary of union membership 1996-2013354 
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In addition to membership density, the total number of actual union members 
also decreased. Prior to the Workplace Relations, there were 2,251,800 recorded 
union members. Nearing the end of this system in 2007 there were 1,696,400 
union members. This represents a 555,400 decline in actual members, or 25% 
decrease. In contrast, in 1995 there was 6,882,200 recorded persons engaged in 
the Australian workforce, which increased in 2007 to 8,776,800. Therefore, 
while unions lost 25% of its actual members; the total workforce grew by 25% 
with 1,894,600 new persons.  
 
Overall the impact of the reforms from 1996-2013 (when compared against 1995 
data) on the union movement resulted in a union membership decline of 15.7% 
with actual members declining by 504,200 members or 22%. During the same 
period the total workforce grew by 49% (from 6,882,200 to 10,258,500).  
 
The Australian system internationally contextualised  
Union membership trends have declined worldwide. Whereas Australia’s union 
membership declined by 15.7% from 2007-2013, the UK declined by 6.8% from 
32.4% to 25.6%.355 The US declined by 2.7% from 14% to 11.3%.356 While the US 
membership rates are approximately half that of Australia and the UK, since 
1904 neither the US nor the UK have experienced such a momentous declines in 
membership over any 18-year period. Up until the mid-1990s, the US and the UK 
(to varying degrees) operated under a voluntarism approach with limited 
regulation of labour laws. In 2000, the UK’s new statutory recognition procedure 
came into force, enabling union recognition on majority support.357 The 
Australian framework during this time moved from compulsory unionism with 
union recognition, to a system that provided no recognition and individualism. It 
could be said that the arbitration system potentially provided excessive security 
to the Australian unions. Post 1996 union membership declines indicate that 
unions were drawn into false securities. 
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To conclude, it can be statistically demonstrated that a contributing link exists 
between the Workplace Relations and Fair Work systems impacting on union 
membership. The consequence of these governments’ reforms was a decline 
from a majority representative organisation to a 17% minority.     
 
 
5.5 Strike action decline  
An analysis of 1996-2013 demonstrates the unions’ capacity to organise strike 
action was heavily regulated by the reforms resulting in significant declines 
(Figure 2). The earliest recording of industrial disputes was in 1985. This year 
was also the highest recorded peak with 1,895 disputes. In contrast, during the 
Howard government, disputes peaked at 731. When comparing these points, the 
Howard reforms demonstrate a decline of 1,163 disputes, or 61%. While the 
Labor government further suppressed industrial disputes to a peak of 236. When 
compared to the 1985 arbitration peak, this resulted in a decline of 1,659 
industrial disputes, or 88%.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Summary of industrial disputes 1996-2013358 
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This can establish that the regulation of industrial action by the WR Act and FW 
Act had a causative impact on the union movement’s ability to organise 
industrial action demonstrated by declines of 61% to 88%.  
 
 
5.6 From freedom of association to disassociation 
Freedom of association promotes organised collective activity with unions being 
the institutional organ that facilitates this right. As a function, unions undertake 
employee representation, service, government lobbying, and regulation. Thus, 
the effectiveness of unions could be measured by exercising these activities 
under the freedom of association rights.  
 
Under these reforms, the freedom to disassociate created a new category of 
individual protection separate from union membership. It disembodied the 
notion of union membership. The reforms dictated that independent of its 
members, unions no longer have an interest in collective bargaining, right of 
entry, and dispute advocacy. Thus, the role of unions has been narrowed to 
member’s representation, in contrast its former function as an institution of 
collective workers’ voices359 as a recognised party in the employment 
relationship.  
 
Ewing considers that the promotion of voluntary unionism relies on free market 
principles to justify the protection of an individualist freedom not to associate. 
Hence, unions will be more likely to take up service and limit individual 
representative functions.360 For Ewing, the key union function is regulatory,361 yet 
union membership is not necessary to obtain this benefit. However, employees 
seeking the lesser activities of representation and servicing access this through 
membership. As Ewing discussed in the UK,362 unions’ regulatory role is also 
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diminishing. This sentiment equally applies to the effects of recent Australian 
reforms due to government agency advocating for workers, and bargaining 
restrictions of content in agreement, non-union agreements, and the operation 
of Modern Awards. Hence, the concern of a declining membership could result in 
diminishing regulatory activity.  
 
As a whole, these reforms fail to protect workers’ rights. They are not consistent 
with Australia’s international obligations and removed unions from the 
workplace. This highlights the importance of the organising model approach to 
increase activism, whereby ensuring unions maintain a workplace presence. It 
also suggests the prominence of future reforms returning to traditional freedom 
of association principles, so that to protect workers’ involved in activism. 
 
 
5.7 From collectivism to individualism 
The Howard, Rudd and Gillard governments’ reforms focused on individualism by 
instigated agreement-making without union representation through non-
unionised individual and collective agreements. Bray and Stewart confirmed 
regulation supporting ‘individualisation of rule-making processes and employee 
voice’ as the dominant trend.363 Such an approach is far removed from 
traditional collectivism. In fact, individual employees now carry the onus to 
exclusively pursue individual rights in bargaining and representation. 
 
For Peetz, non-union involved agreements undermine genuine collective 
bargaining and generate poor outcomes for workers.364 In effect, unions can no 
longer be ‘a party’ to an agreement (with the exception of Greenfields 
Agreements), as they can only represent a union member.365 Unions have no 
greater rights of protection than non-union bargaining representatives. 
Furthermore, unions cannot prevent employers from approaching employees 
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directly to form non-unionised agreements.366 Notably, it is unlikely that the 
Abbott government will addressed such criticism through future reforms. 
 
In summary, individualism diminishes the strength of collectivism (workers as a 
united voice) for the advancement of employment conditions. Consequently, 
unions need to work harder to overcome individualism through exercising the 
organising model by promoting mobilisation, activism, and solidarity. 
 
 
5.8 The future of the union movement 
The recent 18-years of reforms has weakened the union movement, impacting on 
its ability to function. Individualism and freedom to disassociate methodologies 
has distant unions from the employment relationship. Individualism has 
restricted unions’ collective strength and involvement in agreement-making. 
Disassociation has alienated group protective rights. The reforms also 
constrained unions from advocating, organising, and accessing the workplace. 
Quantitative ABS statistical data summarised that the reforms caused significant 
declines in industrial action and union membership. Thus, these factors could 
evidently advocate this dissertation’s aim in substantiating that the post-1996 
reforms had a significant impact on the union movement.  
 
Undoubtedly, the Australian union movement faces difficult times ahead. Its 
ability to operate collectively will hinge on the Abbott government. It could be 
theorised that the government is taking steps to strategically secure future 
reforms with minimal opposition from unions. However, any positive future for 
the unions is clouded by potential public damages resulting from the Royal 
Commission and the Productivity Commission.  
 
Unions are in a dubious position to drive the movement into organisational gains 
in the near future unless aided by reforms, or economic and political change. 
The union movement’s historical relationship with the Coalition party has been 
fraught, thus positive reforms returning unions to a majority workplace 
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representative is improbable. Indeed, unions must pursue and prioritise the 
organising works model. Peetz and Pocock support this progression indicating 
that increased democratic power within unions, leading to more members being 
able to influence union decision-making, would result in a stronger movement.367 
While this leaves the union movement with much work ahead, there is scope for 
cautious optimism. To renew efforts in membership growth with the organising 
model, unions must increase workplace activism through the recruitment of 
workplace delegates. They must be supported with grass-roots training, 
mentoring, and union-to-official networks. To build strength, members must be 
involved across all aspects of the union. Yet, renewed strength is contingent on 
the members’ willingness to act collectively, so direction is essential. In return, 
unions must critique their delivery service to ensure benefits provide valued 
membership. Communication between unions, officials and members must be 
systematic. It is hoped that this may address the decline of unionisation by 
encouraging member participation, membership retention, and recruitment.  
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